Reading time: 26 minutes
Sahel in flames, Senegal suspended
The Sahel, a semi-arid band stretching from the Atlantic to the Red Sea, has now become one of the most serious security, humanitarian and geopolitical crises of the 21st century.
The Mauritania to Sudan, passing through Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad, whole states are crumbling under repeated attacks by jihadist groups, disintegration of institutions, endemic corruption and the growing grip of foreign powers.
This prolonged disorder, fuelled by identity conflicts, international rivalries and the collapse of governance, now threatens to cross the borders of countries officially « stable ».
Among these neighbours so far relatively spared, the Senegal appears as a fragile sanctuary.
The country is not immune to regional contagion, however, with a democracy that is more rooted than its Sahelian neighbours.
The current crisis in the Sahel is not simply a localized conflict: it is a geopolitical cluster bomb whose shrapnel could soon extend to the tip of the Almadies.
Understanding the roots of this chaos, its ramifications and the warning signals that flash at the Senegalese border is a vital imperative to anticipate and guard against an inevitable destabilization if nothing is done. Let us make an exhaustive and uncompromising point.
The origins of Sahelian chaos: collapse, betrayal and jihad
The current crisis in Mali and the Sahel did not settle overnight.
She finds her sources in a succession of political errors, of geostrategic changes andState collapses.
Among the major triggers, the fall of the Muammar Gaddafi regime in 2011 in Libya plays a central role.
Libyan honeycomb: genesis of a disaster
Before his fall, Gaddafi had made Libya a Military Statebased on tribal alliances and an economy of oil rent.
Beneficiaries of a considerable oil rent, « friends » He sold all kinds of weapons to him well beyond the needs of his army, largely composed of Tuareg and Chadian mercenaries, and which constituted a backup force, loyal as long as money was circulating.
The fall of the Libyan Guide, orchestrated with the support of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, led to a mass dissemination of weapons, combatants and chaos across the Sahel.
Without their employer, the former Tuaregs returned to Mali in arms, carrying a new breath for their independent cause.
The MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad) was then created, and quickly entered into an alliance with the jihadist groups, first useful, then dominators.
Displaced Borders: How Algeria Repelled the Islamic Threat to the Sahel
During the 1990s, Algeria was plunged into a bloody civil war between the State and armed Islamist groups, a dark period often called the « Black decade ».
This conflict, born in the wake of the cancellation of the parliamentary elections won by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), has resulted in thousands of deaths and deeply affected Algerian society.
In the face of this internal threat, the army and the security services have waged a fierce struggle, combining military repression, intelligence and deradicalization policies. Gradually, the Islamic maquis were reduced, isolated in mountainous areas, and then pushed back to the south of the country.
It is in these vast Saharan areas, difficult to monitor, that many jihadists have found refuge, crossing porous borders to settle in northern Mali, an area already marked by state abandonment and community tensions.
Thus, what was once an Algerian internal war has contributed to the spread of terrorism throughout the Sahel.
This geographical displacement of combatants has facilitated the emergence of transnational groups, well-established in border areas, and has made the security challenges of the region more complex.
Malian soil: institutional fragility and organized chaos
Mali, a vast landlocked territory, already had many frailties:
- Recurrent Touaregue Rebellions in the North, where people feel marginalized and refuse the authority of a State perceived as « foreign ».
- Progressive implementation of armed Islamist groups, notably AQMI, Al-Murabitoune, then the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS).
- An Inefficient Army, underequipped, corrupt, led by military elites often more concerned with their comfort in Bamako than with national security.
- A society infiltrated by Wahhabi religious fundamentalismimported from Saudi Arabia through educational, community and religious networks.
This combination of internal factors opened a boulevard for jihadist groups that, in a few years, controlled entire regions, especially in the north and central part of the country.
French intervention and its limitations
Faced with the imminent collapse of Mali in 2012-2013, the French military intervention via Operation Serval, then Barkhane, allowed the jihadists to push back. But this action, without coherent political and institutional support, quickly came within limits:
- Increasing mistrust by local populations of a perceived neocolonial force.
- Strategic inconsistencies, particularly on the Tuarègue issue.
- Failure to restore Malian State authority in areas « Released ».
In 2022, France withdrew from Mali. The Malian state, led by putschists, then turned to Russia and engaged the paramilitary group Wagner, now replaced by Africa Corps.
But this alliance is just a new avatar of the security dependency, with a high cost, both human and economic.
Divorce with ECOWAS and the regional divide
In 2023-2024, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, three countries led by military juntas, successively left the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which they accused of being instrumentalized by France.
They then formed the Confederation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), in a logic of total rupture with the post-colonial West African order.
This change in regional paradigm increases the isolation of still standing democracies, such as Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire, now surrounded by a belt of authoritarian and unstable regimes.
The intensification of the jihadist threat: towards an asymmetric war without end
Since the fall of Gaddafi and the first jihadist offensive against Mali in 2012, the terrorist threat has stopped spreading and transforming.
The already fragile Sahelian region is today the new global epicenter of Islamist terrorism, surpassing even the Middle East in number of victims.
In 2024, more than 8,500 people were killed in jihadist attacks in the Sahel, an absolute record.
A changing face
Armed groups are no longer mere disorganized rebel gangs. They have professionalized, equipped and territorialized. Today, there are two main poles:
- The Islamic and Muslim Support Group (JNIM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, active in Mali, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire.
- Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS), affiliated with Daesh, very violent, operating mainly in the area of the three borders (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso).
Both entities compete for territory, populations and resources, while conducting coordinated attacks against national forces and civilians.
In addition, new operating procedures are emerging:
- Increased use of drones for surveillance and targeted assassination.
- Increasingly common suicide attacksincluding against schools and hospitals.
- Exploitation of cyberspace for propaganda, recruitment and radicalisation.
A growing territorial grip
According to the United Nations, almost 60 per cent of Mali's territory is now outside State control. In some rural areas of Burkina Faso, jihadist groups behave as local authorities: they tax, judge, educate and recruit.
People, abandoned by their governments, often turn out of necessity to those groups that offer them some form of order.
This territorial extension also results in the closure of several thousand schools in the region, affecting nearly 2 million children. The educational vacuum in turn feeds the jihadist ranks, creating a cycle of self-reliant violence.
Instrumentalisation of tensions between nomads and sedentaries: a lever of war and terror
Among the most destructive dynamics of the Sahelian crisis is thedeliberate exacerbation of historical tensions between nomadic populations, including the Peuls, and sedentary groups (Dogons, Mossis, Bambaras, etc.).
These old conflicts, often related to access to water, agricultural land or pasture, have been cynically instrumentalised by jihadist groupswhich exploit the sense of abandonment, marginalization or persecution felt by some communities.
By presenting themselves as « defenders » of the Peuls against abuses by security forces or village militias, Islamist extremists have facilitated their settlement in rural areas and increased their capacity to recruitment in unemployed pastoral youth.
In return, this strategy has generated violent counter-reactions, often encouraged by armed self-defence groups, resulting in a spiral of community reprisals.
This dynamic has led to massacres of rare brutality, like those in Sobane-Da (Mali) or Yirgou (Burkina Faso), which involve mass crimes and even crimes against humanity.
The humanitarian consequences are disastrous: entire villages scratched from the map, hundreds thousands of displaced people, destabilization of pastoral life, and deep intercommunal fractures now rooted.
This ethnic and social divide, exploited by terrorists, threatens to permanently disintegrate the Sahelian social fabric.
Women, the first invisible victims
The Sahelian crisis is also a gender crisis. According to UN Women, women and girls are the preferred targets of armed groups:
- Forced marriages with fighters.
- Systematic sexual violenceoften filmed to terrorize communities.
- School exclusion and loss of autonomyin areas controlled by extremist Islamists.
- Use as human shields or in suicide bombings.
Terrorism, in its ideological dimension, aims to impose a total regression of women's rights and to reshape Sahelian societies according to a retrograde and patriarchal model.
A regionalized, cross-border and adaptive threat
Jihadist groups recognize no borders. They travel easily from Mali to Burkina Faso, then Niger, sometimes via Nigeria or even Mauritania. This fluidity is facilitated by:
- The porosity of borders.
- The complicity of local actorsespecially in abandoned rural areas.
- The existence of transnational criminal networks (traffic weapons, drugs, gold, fuels, etc.).
In 2024 and 2025, a number of attacks were recorded in the vicinity of Senegal, including Diboli and Kayeon the border with Mali. This is the first direct alert, and it confirms what analysts have feared for years: the contagion is on.
Failure of stabilization policies
Despite billions of dollars of international aid, the situation is not improving. The gradual withdrawal of Western forces (France, Germany, United States) left a void that neither local armies nor new foreign forces like Africa Corps (ex-Wagner) can't fill.
Furthermore, the fight against terrorism faces a dilemma: How can we fight an ideology with tanks, without offering social, educational and economic alternatives?
The pure security approach has shown its limits.
Russian interference and the geopolitical restructuring of the Sahel
As France gradually withdrew from Mali from 2022, the vacuum left by Operation Barkhane soon became filled by a foreign power with divergent interests: Russia.
This return to power is part of a global logic of expanding Russian influence in Africa, exploiting post-colonial resentments, Western failures, and the opportunism of authoritarian regimes.
Wagner, first actor of the « strategic partnership »
In 2022, after the military coup in Mali, the Malian junta appealed to the paramilitary group Wagner, then led by Evgueni Prigojine.
Presented as an alternative to « domination » This private militia is rapidly deployed in the most sensitive areas of the country.
But behind the image of a protective force, Wagner acted as a predatory economic actor. The group quickly secured access to several gold, lithium and uranium sites, raising its protection against mining concessions, resources and opaque agreements.
Serious allegations of killings of civilians, extrajudicial executions (including in Moura in 2022) and intimidation against NGOs have been documented by the United Nations and independent NGOs.
From Wagner to Africa Corps
After the death of Prigojin in August 2023, Wagner was gradually absorbed by the Russian state and renamed Africa Corps, a force officially attached to the Ministry of Defence.
This name change is accompanied by an attempt to legitimize: Russian mercenaries now become « Military Advisers »bases are redeployed and contracts secured by bilateral treaties.
However, the objectives have not changed: control of strategic resources, permanent military presence, political influence on the juntas (notably via pro-Russian media such as RT and Sputnik Africa).
This russification of Sahelian security is accompanied by aggressive anti-Western rhetoric, fuelling a populist discourse on « African emancipation » which seduces some of the local youth, frustrated by poverty and unemployment.
A land of global confrontation
The Sahel thus becomes a zone of indirect confrontation between major powers:
- Russiavia Africa Corps, bets on supporting authoritarian regimes to secure strategic military resources and bases.
- China, more discreet, invests heavily in infrastructure (roads, dams, telecommunications), while securing its supplies of raw materials.
- Turkey, presented by military and educational cooperation, plays the card of religious diplomacy.
- The European Union and the USA, weakened by their withdrawal, seek new partnerships, but suffer from a serious confidence deficit.
This new African Grand Game transforms the Sahel into a diplomatic powderbox, where alliances are formed and disbanded according to interests.
Fragile States Become pawns in a war of influence whose codes and consequences they do not control.
A renewed dependency model
The paradox is obvious: while the official discourses of the junta evoke the regained sovereignty, the use of foreign forces to ensure the security of the territory reproduces the same logics of dependence that weakened post-independence Africa.
Whether it is France yesterday, or Russia today, the foreign powers continue above all their own geopolitical interests :
- Secure trade routes.
- Access to strategic resources (gold, uranium, oil).
- Power display on the international stage.
And in the meantime, the Sahelian States, instead of building their own national capacities, become de facto protectorates, delivered to predation logics that compromise their long-term future.
Trafficking, cross-border crime and weakening of States
The Sahelian security crisis is not based solely on religious ideology or geopolitical ambitions.
It is also part of a complex criminal system, where armed groups, traffickers and corrupt elites combine in a thriving parallel economy.
Security chaos feeds these illicit networks, which in turn further weaken States.
This infernal spiral is one of the greatest challenges for the Sahel and its neighbours, including Senegal.
Drug routes: a narco-Sahel in gestation
For more than a decade, the Sahel has become a major hub of drug trafficking to Europe. South American cocaine landed on the coasts of Guinea-Bissau, Gambia or Cape Verde, before transiting inland, including through Mali, Niger and Mauritania.
These roads now cross eastern Senegal (Tambacounda, Kédougou), areas where local criminal networks cooperate with international cartels. Moroccan cannabis also follows a reverse route via the Sahel, creating a convergence of North-South and South-North flows.
This trafficking generates huge profits, used by armed groups to buy weapons, recruit young people, corrupt officials and strengthen their territorial control. Drugs become this way an asymmetric war fuel.
Illegal extortion and criminalization of resources
At the same time, the explosion of artisanal goldmaking throughout the Sahelian band, particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Senegal, has created an informal market beyond state control.
In Kedugu and the hills of Saraya (Senegal), thousands of goldsmiths, sometimes foreigners, exploit gold with archaic and dangerous methods.
This activity also attracts arms traffickers, bandits, intermediaries from Mali or Guinea, and often extremist groups seeking to control the resource.
Gold is then used to finance the war, or to launder money internationally via opaque commercial channels.
In some cases, entire mining areas escape state authority, becoming anarchic mini-republics where the law is dictated by force and money.
Small arms: silent proliferation
The region is now invaded by weapons of war circulating without control, from the Libyan stockpiles looted in 2011, but also from internal trafficking. Nigeria, with its arms workshops and Islamist rebels, is also a major source.
The stakes are all the more critical as these weapons could fall into their hands:
- Local criminal gangs that would change their size.
- Radical groups looking for a back base.
- Or worse, jihadist cells trying to strike in urban areas.
Corruption: institutional cancer
Trafficking thrives through systemic corruption that undermines Sahelian states. In Mali, Burkina and Niger, entire sections of the army and police are suspected of collaborating with traffickers, turning a blind eye to convoys, protecting illegal exploitation areas or selling seizures.
The danger is that this model will contaminate neighbouring countries. While Senegal remains generally better governed, weak signals appear:
- Testimonials of extortion in mining areas.
- Lack of control over financial flows from gold mining sites.
If these trends increase, they could pave the way for a slow but lasting infiltration of criminal networks into institutions, creating a structural fragility conducive to instability
Senegal: A Sanctuary Threatened at the Doors of Chaos · Global Voices
In a Sahel torn apart by terrorism, coups d'état and geopolitical recomposition, Senegal is an exception.
To date, the country has been spared direct jihadist attacks, while maintaining some political stability.
However, current dynamics in the subregion suggest a high-risk scenario in which Senegal, if it does not take the lead, could be drawn into the spiral of violence ravaging its neighbours.
A strategic and dangerous geographical location
Senegal shares a land border of more than 400 km with Mali, particularly in the eastern region of Tambacounda and Kédougou, two historically marginalized, unsecured areas, with terrain conducive to infiltration.
This proximity to a Malian territory largely out of state control makes Senegal a vulnerable neighbour, just like Côte d'Ivoire, which has already experienced several incursions.
In May 2024, an armed attack at Diboli, a border post between Mali and Senegal, ended a tenacious illusion that the national barrier would be sufficient to contain violence.
Internal security flaws ignored
Senegal has a relatively well-structured army, known for its discipline and experience in peacekeeping operations.
But many internal vulnerabilities can be exploited by extremist groups:
- Uncontrolled border areas, with weak security mesh.
- Increasing illicit traffic in the south-east (smuggling, drugs, weapons).
- Presence of a Wahhabi Rigorist Islam, especially in certain religious circles close to the Gulf, whose ideology may constitute a ground of radicalisation.
- Social frustrations massive youth unemployment, rural poverty, large regional disparities.
These elements are the same ingredients that led to the fragmentation of Mali and Burkina Faso.
The feeling of exclusion from certain peripheral areas, such as Kedugu, Sedhiou or Matam, combined with unworked youth and powerful religious networks, creates an explosive equation in the medium term.
The temptation of mimicry: Rwandan scenario?
The risk for Senegal also extends to the contagion of conflicts, as occurred in Central Africa following the 1994 Rwandan genocide.
The Rwandan conflict has led to massive migrations, the militarization of refugees, and eventually set the entire Great Lakes region on fire, including the first Congo War (1996–1997).
A similar scenario could occur if the humanitarian situation in Mali, Niger or Burkina Faso continues to deteriorate.
The massive waves of refugees, carrying trauma, but also infiltrated by disguised combatants, could to Senegalespecially in the Kayes, Tambacounda and Bakel regions.
The trap of complacency
One of the most insidious dangers facing Senegal is the temptation to believe in its exceptionality. Of course, the country has demonstrated a certain democratic resilience, even during the recent presidential alternation of 2024.
But this relative stability must not mask a brutal reality: no state in the region is now sheltered.
As the Ivorian example has shown, peace can shift rapidly if intelligence services are overwhelmed, regional cooperation is broken, or if a successful symbolic attack strikes public opinion.
What can be done to avoid burning?
Faced with the magnitude of the threats, the temptation of fatalism is great. Yet there are room for manoeuvre. Preserving Senegal's stability and strengthening regional resilience requires multidimensional approach, combining military, diplomatic, economic, and social responses. Here are some priority areas for action.
Rethinking regional security: towards a credible Sahelian force
The failure of the G5 Sahel, marked by successive withdrawals from Mali, Burkina and Niger, revealed the fragility of West African military arrangements. To avoid the security isolation of Senegal and other still democratic ECOWAS countries, it is urgent to:
- Create a new military coalition under expanded regional mandateincluding the forces of Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Benin, Togo, Senegal and Guinea-Bissau.
- Strengthening advanced bases in critical border areas, especially in Kidira, Bakel, and Kédougou.
- Establish a unified operational command, capable of rapid cross-border coordination.
Such a force, with African funding and supported by strategic partners (European Union, African Union, United States), would be far more legitimate than a unilateral external presence.
Strengthening intelligence, borders and communities
A war against asymmetric groups is not only won by tanks or drones. It requires mastery of human and technological intelligencewhich Senegal absolutely must strengthen:
- Training specialized intelligence units in local analysis, regional languages, religious dynamics.
- Establish a digital border surveillance network, coupled with regional biometric databases.
- Working with local communities, including customary leaders, marabouts, moderate imams and youth leaders, to detect weak signals of radicalization or infiltration.
The support of local populations is an essential lever of territorial stability.
Preventing radicalization through human development
No security strategy can succeed without attacking the social roots of despair. The most exposed regions are also the poorest. It is therefore crucial to:
- Massive increase in public investment in peripheral regions: infrastructure, education, health.
- Developing agricultural and craft sectors High labour intensity.
- Strengthening access to moderate religious educationby supporting Koranic schools that advocate tolerance and reject violence.
The prevention of radicalisation requires inclusion, dignity and justice.
Combating economic and political crime
The link between illicit trafficking and power networks must be broken. This requires:
- A truly independent justice, capable of prosecuting economic crimes and political-criminal connections.
- Regional judicial cooperation, with cross-border arrest warrants and traceability of suspicious financial flows.
- Total transparency in mining areas, with public audits of concessions and revenues extracted.
It is by draining the financial resources of the crime that armed groups can be permanently weakened.
Enhancing the role of women in peace and security
Women are at the same time first victims of the crisis and the first actresses of resilience. Any sustainable strategy must:
- Include women in security and political decision-making processes.
- Support local women's networks in mediation, early warning and peace education initiatives.
- Protecting girls from early school leaving and early marriage, particularly in risk areas.
Human development and peace require the empowerment of women.
Time is no longer blind, but at anticipation
The Sahel is on fire. Mali is collapsing. Burkina Faso is on its knees. Niger's wavering. In this tumult, Senegal, often perceived as a stable exception, can no longer afford to look elsewhere.
He's today a conflict without borders, a war that does not say its name, and a civilizational shock where geopolitical ambitions, social frustrations and deadly fanaticism intersect.
African history is full of examples where Inaction cost more than combat. The Rwandan genocide and its repercussions on the Congo, the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars, the implosions of Somalia and Libya, are all painful reminders that The collapse of one state can lead to several more in its fall.
Senegal must therefore act without delayby mobilizing all its resources, human, diplomatic, military, religious, social, to prevent the worst. This responsibility goes beyond the Senegalese State: it commits ECOWAS, the African Union and the international community as a whole.
We must rethink the security approach, reshape regional alliances, strengthen local economies and, above all, restore trust between citizens and institutions.
For it is not only Senegal's future that is being played today, but that of all West Africa, caught between two trajectories: that of a continent that chooses real sovereignty, or that of a fragmented territory, delivered to foreign interests, trafficking and darkness.
The alarm time is over. The action started.
When your neighbor's box burns! ......
