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This dilemma is at the heart of the most widespread political pathology in sub-Saharan Africa: ethnic voting. It is not about ignorance or irrationality. — It is a rational response to a failing institutional context, where community membership is often the only guarantee of access to state resources.
Ethnic voting: rationality in institutional uncertainty
In States where institutions do not guarantee equal access to public services, vote for « someone from his own » is a collective survival strategy. If the state does not build a road in my region because my group is not represented, voting for a representative of my group is rational. This is not irrational tribalism. — It is an adaptation to a failing State.
The trap of community representation
But this individual rationality produces a collectively disastrous result: elected representatives on an ethnic basis have no interest in producing universal public goods — they only have an interest in distributing particular property to their electoral clientele. This vicious circle maintains the institutional weakness that justifies ethnic voting.
Citizenship as a bet on the future
To vote for the competent candidate despite community membership is to bet that the general interest can prevail over group solidarity. It's a risk bet in the short term — But it is the only one that can, in the long term, produce institutions that work for all.
This dilemma does not have a good answer in a bad system. The real question is: how can we change the system so that jurisdiction becomes a legitimate electoral criterion again?
