⏱ Temps de lecture : 17 minutes
Donald Trump's return to the White House plunged Europe into a form of geopolitical sideration.
Announced by clear signals and supported by constant rhetoric, his electoral victory remains nonetheless one earthquake in transatlantic relations.
From the first days of his mandate, the tone is set: the relationship with Europe will not be consensual, friendly or priority. The ambition is displayed: make Europe pay what Trump sees as decades of imbalances, trade abuse and strategic dependency.
Behind the brutality of the words and the radicality of the positions, a reality that is difficult to contest is emerging: Europe has allowed structural asymmetries in its relations with the United States.
In economic, military, technological or diplomatic terms, it is in a multi-faceted dependency situation.
Faced with an American president who no longer believes in historic alliances but reasons in terms of deals, immediate interests and power relations, this dependence becomes a weakness.
Let us examine this reality in depth without claiming to prescribe solutions. The aim here is to offer a clear and factual view of the causes, mechanisms and implications of this transatlantic imbalance in the context of Trump's return to power.
The stakes are less to criticize or justify than to understand.
Europe in the face of Trump's return: the rise of a confrontational logic
A legacy of strategic protection
Since the end of World War II, Europe has evolved under the military protection of the United States. The Marshall Plan, and then the creation of NATO, sealed this founding dependency.
In exchange for this strategic coverage, Europeans have been able to focus on reconstruction, building a social model and deepening their economic integration.
This pattern, long perceived as mutually beneficial, has become institutionalized: the presence of US military bases in Europe, NATO joint exercises, coordination of deterrence doctrines have formed a security architecture perceived as lasting.
Europe, which is often sluggish on military matters, has been able to live in relative strategic carelessness, leaving the United States to ensure the security of the continent.
Trump and the challenge of historical balances
With Donald Trump, this implicit pact is challenged. The slogan «America First» becomes the matrix of all diplomatic and economic decisions.
In this sense, historical alliances no longer have intrinsic value unless they serve the immediate interests of the United States.
Trump denounces an unbalanced transatlantic relationship According to him, the US alone bears the military burden, while Europe benefits commercially from advantageous access to the US market.
It casts off German surpluses, the European sub-contribution to NATO, and the massive presence of European products, including automobiles, on American soil.
A Europe caught short, forced to react
In the face of this rhetorical offensive and its concrete declines (threats of tariff increases, partial withdrawal of troops, bilateral pressures), Europe seems to be taken by surprise.
Its institutions, based on negotiation and compromise, are struggling to react to a confrontational logic. The reaction varies between attempts at dialogue, declarations of principle and concessions.
The imbalance is accentuated: Trump imposes the terms of the debate, and Europe finds itself in a defensive posture, seeking to secure a strategic relationship whose contours it no longer controls.
Asymmetric commercial dependence
The European surplus in goods
Trump's first angle of attack concerns trade flows.
The European Union is structurally in surplus in its trade in goods with the United States. In 2024, according to Eurostat figures, this surplus amounted to around EUR 180 billion, mainly from German exports of cars, machine tools and chemicals.
This situation is explained by several factors:
- Strong industrial competitiveness, particularly in Germany and the Netherlands;
- Relatively low tariffs on imports of European goods into the United States;
- A qualitative preference for some US consumers for certain European products.
For Donald Trump, this trade surplus is a structural injustice that he intends to correct through protectionist measures. It considers that the United States « open their markets » without receiving equivalent reciprocity.
American dominance in services
But this partial reading omits an entire part of reality: the United States is by far surplus in trade in services with Europe.
US exports of services (technology, finance, consulting, licensing...) to Europe far exceed inverse flows.
American digital giants, particularly the GAFAMs, dominate the European landscape. Their establishment is massive, their huge income, their cultural and economic influence difficult to compete with. Similarly, in financial services, the supremacy of American actors is indisputable.
In sum, if Europe is in surplus in goods, it is in deficit in services — a cross-balancing imbalance, often forgotten in public debate but essential to understanding transatlantic tensions.
Despite this complexity, this is the logic of manufactured products. — more visible, more symbolic — which dominates speeches. And it is on this ground that Trump acts.
Europe, although economically strong, is not able to make full use of its strengths in the commercial power relationship.
It suffers more than it imposes, for lack of a sufficiently strong common strategy.
Technological, economic and military dependence: the dead corners of sovereignty
Partial technological sovereignty
On the technological front, Europe's dependence on the US is widely documented. The Digital infrastructure, the cloud services, the strategic electronic components, the Critical data management software The majority are provided or controlled by US actors.
Some European initiatives have tried to reverse the trend, but they are still fragmented, sometimes undersized, or confronted with unfavourable market logics.
In the strategic areas Artificial intelligence, the Advanced cybersecurity or next generation semiconductorsEurope is still largely dependent on imported technologies, or incorporating critical components designed in the United States.
A European army always hypothetical
Militaryly, the situation is even more determined. NATO remains the main structure of European defence, but this structure relies largely on American means:
- Integrated military command;
- Satellite intelligence networks;
- Missile defence systems;
- Nuclear dissuasion, ultimately, by the United States.
While several European countries have significant military capabilities (France, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy), their coordination remains limited. Integrated defence projects, although discussed for decades, are struggling to succeed.
Strategic autonomy, often mentioned, remains more theoretical than real. In case of US withdrawal from NATO — scenario mentioned several times by Trump —Europe would find itself in a vulnerable position, without unified command or immediate projection capability.
The arms race: asymmetric pressure in a context of economic fragility
In the wake of increased geopolitical tensions and repeated US injunctions, Europe is urged to rapidly increase its military spending. Donald Trump, from his first term of office, had demanded that NATO members devote a larger share of their GDP to defence, denouncing with virulence those who did not meet this objective.
Since his return to power, this demand has become even more pressing. But beyond the budget increase, the United States is now making this contribution conditional on direct purchases of US military equipment (hunting aircraft, missile systems, drones, etc.).
This orientation, far from stimulating the European defence industry, contributes to its disarticulation by increasing dependence on US suppliers.
This dynamic takes place in a European economic context marked by the stagnation, rising public debt and strong social pressure.
The accelerated strengthening of military budgets under these conditions, often social, educational or environmental investment, exacerbates internal imbalances and raises debate on the sustainability of these strategic choices.
Rather than promoting a coordinated rise in European defence capabilities, these US injunctions tend to further fragment the continent's military landscape and increase its logistical and technological dependence.
Cross-economic pressures: forced investment and energy dependence
In parallel to these military demands, the Trump administration openly pushes European countries to come massive investment in the United States, particularly in the industrial and technological sectors.
Several European officials have mentioned explicit pressures for companies on the continent to relocate production chains to US soil, or participate in financing strategic infrastructure in the US.
These requests are accompanied by a speech stressing the « Secure relocation » and « transatlantic economic solidarity », but they are actually part of a transfer of value and innovation outside Europe.
The energy question is added: since the war in Ukraine, Europe has reduced its dependence on Russian gas, but has largely turned to American liquefied natural gas (LNG), more expensive, more logistically binding, and sold at sometimes very volatile market prices.
Again, the United States requires long-term contracts and reception infrastructure financed by European states.
By combining the constraints of investment, arms purchase and energy dependence, Europe finds itself caught in a growing circle of external spending, accentuating both its macroeconomic vulnerability and its strategic submission.
A useful comparison: China, a different dependency, a more balanced balance of power
In this tense global configuration, China's position vis-à-vis the United States illustrates a very different dependency dynamic from that of Europe.
In trade terms, China remains heavily dependent on the United States for Export of its manufactured goods. In 2024, the United States still accounted for about 15% of China's exports, mainly in electronics, consumer goods, machinery and textiles.
But this dependence is largely reciprocal. The American consumer, in his daily life, remains heavily dependent on Chinese products: clothing, electronic devices, toys, furniture, spare parts, etc.
This interdependence creates a unstable equilibrium shape where each party has levers on the other.
A prolonged trade war would have immediate consequences for consumer prices in the United States, making certain protectionist decisions politically risky.
Moreover, the China has wider policy space than Europe.
It is not militarily linked to the United States, has its own nuclear deterrent, a partially autonomous industrial apparatus, and a state apparatus capable of rapidly piloting economic or industrial measures in response to external pressure.
It invests heavily in its own technological channels, from AI to semiconductors, even if vulnerabilities remain.
In sum, although economically dependent on the United States, China has been able to build a autonomous strategic base enabling it to resist trade and diplomatic shocks more firmly.
On the other hand, Europe, more fragmented and dependent on key sectors (defence, cybersecurity, innovation), finds itself in a much more constrained position.
Europe and Russia: a neighbourhood that has become hostile
A failed transition after the fall of the USSR
The end of the Soviet Union in 1991 was interpreted in Western Europe as a victory without sharing the democratic and liberal model.
But this triumphalist reading led to a certain blindness. Europe did not know or wanted to accompany Russia in its political and economic transition.
Instead of accompanying Russia as part of a «Marshall Plan », priority was given to enlargement to the east of the European Union and NATO, without gradual integration of Russia into a cooperative framework.
The Russian economy, weakened, was delivered to the hands of unscrupulous oligarchsto the detriment of sustainable institutional structure.
Moreover, the accelerated privatization of the Russian economy in the 1990s, conducted without solid institutional safeguards, led to a massive concentration of wealth in the hands of a handful of close-to-power businessmen.
The former Soviet conglomerates (in energy, raw materials, heavy industry, telecommunications) were derisoryly priced under the so-called "privatisation by vouchers" or "loans for shares”.
This operation allowed some insiders to appropriate the most strategic assets of the former USSR, creating a ultra-rich class in record time.
These oligarchs have often moved their fortunes abroad, notably to Londonon the French Riviera or Paris, where they acquired luxury properties, investment in real estate, football clubs or Art, while living in comfort and opulence.
This phenomenon has caused both fascination and anxiety in the West, but it has mainly been a result of the helped to widen the gap between a wealthy cosmopolitan elite and a Russian population faced with the collapse of its standard of living, economic insecurity and democratic disillusionment.
From disintegration to revenge: the return of Russian power
The vacuum left in the 1990s led to the emergence of a strong and centralized power. Vladimir Putin built its authority on a discourse of restoring power, regaining sovereignty, refusing humiliation.
Little by little, Russia has returned to the forefront as a geopolitical power claiming a major role in its «Closer foreigner».
Annexation of the Crimea, the conflict in Ukraine, the strengthening of the military arsenal and the modernization of the Russian armed forces illustrate this desire to become a respected global player again — or feared.
Increasing tension, without clear diplomatic outcome
The dialogue between Europe and Russia has been extended, replaced by mutual distrust, economic sanctions and military postures. The space of a constructive neighbourhood has closed.
Russia sees NATO as a direct threat, and Europe as a passive extension of American interests.
Europe, for its part, fears Moscow's expansionist policy and strengthens its security dependence on Washington.
This strategic impasse locks the two blocs in a logic of permanent confrontation, depriving Europe of an axis of autonomy vis-à-vis the United States, and placing Russia in a position of systemic opposition.
An unexpected echo: Trump's vision of Ukraine, close to the Russian strategic narrative
Surprisingly, Donald Trump's comments suggest a form of implicit convergence with Vladimir Putin's geopolitical reading of the origins of the conflict in Ukraine.
Although he never expresses it as articulated as the Russian President, Trump seems to share the idea that the European insistence — and wider Western — to integrate Ukraine into NATO is a Major strategic error.
In his public speeches, he regularly criticizes the « unnecessary provocations » Europe and accuses European leaders of wanting to drag the United States into a conflict they do not control.
This posture refers, even implicitly, to a classical conception of the «strategic depth» Russia, according to which the former Soviet republics, and more broadly the countries of the former East Block, form an essential buffer zone for Moscow's security. By suggesting that the war in Ukraine could have been avoided if the West had « better understood » The Kremlin's red lines, Trump breaks with the traditional Atlanticist line and throws trouble on the reading unity of the conflict.
This position does not necessarily mean support for Russia, but it weakens the European positionby partially validating, in the eyes of some observers, the Russian argument about NATO expansion as a trigger for war.
This reinforces Europe's sense of strategic isolation and further complicates its diplomatic policy space.
Conclusion
Donald Trump's return to the presidency of the United States acts as a relentless indicator of the vulnerabilities that Europe has accumulated over the decades.
Strategically dependent on the United States for its security, commercially exposed, technologically and energetically fragmented decision-making, the European Union is today facing a harsh geopolitical reality, without the diplomatic safety net that had long allowed it to evolve in a relatively stable environment.
This second Trump mandate is part of a logic of confrontation assumed: demand for US arms purchases, pressure for industrial investment on US soil, increased dependence on US liquefied natural gas, and ambiguous discourse on US engagement in Europe.
Presidential rhetoric sometimes flirts with the Kremlin's strategic theses, questioning the relevance of NATO's enlargement to the East, thus strengthening Europe's isolation from the Ukrainian conflict.
Militaryly, the injunction to increase defence budgets, in a tense economic context, pushes European states to redirect considerable resources towards the purchase of foreign equipment, often at the expense of their industrial autonomy or social cohesion.
This dynamic weakens national economies while strengthening transatlantic dependency, rather than reducing it.
Finally, the comparison with China reveals that, although Beijing is also commercially interdependent with Washington, it has an autonomous strategic base, giving it a much wider margin of manoeuvre in managing international tensions. Europe, on the other hand, appears increasingly constrained in its choices, both dependent and vulnerable, without immediate projection capacity or alternative.
This is not to blame, but to observe with clarity and method a complex and evolving situation.
It is now up to European decision-makers, each in their own role, to assess the consequences of this multiple dependence and to consider, with clarity and responsibility, the ways of strategic recovery adapted to the realities of the 21st century.
