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Reform to ensure: democracy, rule of law and effective justice in Senegal
A citizen, republican and non-partisan contribution to the debate on the constitutional and institutional reform of 2026.
Senegal has a major political and legal tradition in Africa. This tradition, however, does not exempt a lucid examination of the institutional frailties revealed by recent history: concentration of powers, real or perceived dependence on certain institutions, weakness of parliamentary control, electoral tensions, extensive recourse to exceptional procedures and difficulties in accessing prompt and impartial justice.
The present dossier does not give rise to partisan logic or a challenge in principle by the public authorities. It is a citizen's contribution to improving the Republican Pact. His ambition is to propose guarantees that would remain useful regardless of the power holder, the parliamentary majority or the political orientation of the Government.
1. Executive summary
The constitutional reform project of 2026 contains real progress: seeking a better balance within the Executive, partisan neutrality of the President, guiding the presidential transition, strengthening parliamentary control, transforming the Constitutional Council into a Constitutional Court, asserting digital rights and improving information on natural resources. These guidelines can help consolidate Senegalese democracy.
However, they remain insufficient to prevent hyperpresidentialism on a sustainable basis. A constitutional democracy is not only based on the personal moderation of the leaders. It involves institutions capable of resisting a homogeneous political majority, conflicting procedures, pluralist appointments, own opposition rights and legally applicable sanctions.
The dossier recommends a coherent package of reforms around eight axes:
| Finding | Recommended response | Effect sought |
|---|---|---|
| Dominant presidency and extensible skills | Limitedly listed own powers; counterseing in principle | Accountability and traceability of decisions |
| Institutionally fragile Prime Minister | Parliamentary inquiry; framed revocation; constructive motion of censure | Self-government and stable |
| Parliament dependent on majority | Constitutional rights of the opposition; drawing right; review of appointments | Effective control of the Executive |
| Justice exposed to executive influence | Independent MSC; assent; Public prosecution without individual instructions | Impartiality and public trust |
| Constitutional judge appointed by power | Appointments distributed, public hearings, qualified majority | Independence of the Constitutional Court |
| Crisis powers and limited restrictions | Short periods, parliamentary approval, immediate judicial review | Prevention of abuse in times of crisis |
| Opacity of public commitments | Publication of contracts and beneficial owners; audit of the Court of Auditors | Financial responsibility and anti-corruption |
| Electoral clientelism and hidden party financing | Substantial and immediate public financing, private donation capping, independent oversight body | Equality of competitors and reduction in the purchasing of votes |
2. Context and purpose of the reform
On 27 April 2026, the Presidency of the Republic released four preliminary drafts of the national dialogues on justice and the political system: constitutional review, the Constitutional Court Organization Act, the Electoral Code with the establishment of an independent National Electoral Commission, and the Political Parties Act. This publication represents a step forward in transparency and opens up a space for public deliberation.
The Constitutional Council, seized by the President of the Republic, issued Decision No. 4/C/2026 on 13 May 2026. It accepted the revision initiative in principle, while imposing several corrections, including on the respect for the intangibles of article 103 and on certain drafting arrangements for the Council's transformation into a Constitutional Court.
At the date of this contribution, reform must be seen as an ongoing process. A distinction should be made between the preliminary draft Government, the constitutional corrections, the parliamentary text and the version to be adopted. The recommendations made here relate to the institutional architecture and remain relevant at the various stages of the procedure.
2.1. Main directions of the project
- Rebalancing the relations between the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister.
- A partisan withdrawal of the President and restriction of his participation in the campaigns.
- Framework for decisions taken during the presidential transition.
- Creation of a Constitutional Court and redefinition of constitutional control.
- Strengthening parliamentary committees of inquiry and information.
- Information to the Assembly on certain conventions relating to natural resources.
- Affirmation of environmental, digital and good governance rights.
- Increased incompatibility among members of the Government.
3. Democratic evaluation of the project
The general orientation is in favour of democratic consolidation. The project responds to several old criticisms of the Senegalese institutional order and introduces useful preventive mechanisms. Its main weakness, however, is the discrepancy between the principles announced and the guarantees of implementation.
| Area | Advanced | Limit or risk | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Presidential transition | Reduction of acts committed in a sustainable manner | Current affairs and imperatives to be clarified | Strong advanced, to make justiciable |
| Neutrality of the President | Symbolic separation between head of state and party leader | Informal influence and indirect use of public resources | Advanced useful but limited controlability |
| Prime Minister | Recognition of an enhanced role | Revocation, arbitration and political responsibility still ambiguous | Incomplete balancing |
| Parliament | Commissions of Inquiry and Information | Majority likely to block control initiatives | Conditional progress |
| Constitutional Court | Enhanced jurisdiction and non-renewable mandate | Potentially concentrated appointment | High potential, depending on governance |
| Ordinary justice | Reforms announced in a broader package | Independence of the Public Prosecutor's Office and CSM insufficiently constitutionalised | Main dead angle |
| Natural resources | Increased information to Parliament | Lack of prior authorisation and full publication | Partial transparency |
| Digital rights | Constitutional recognition | Recourse and restriction criteria to be specified | Normative progress to be implemented |
3.1. Assessment criteria selected
The project must be evaluated not according to the intentions of current governments, but according to its ability to limit a future power less respectful of freedoms. A good Constitution is a mechanism for preventing opportunistic behaviour. It must make abuse legally costly, institutionally difficult and politically visible.
4. Diagnosis of institutional vulnerabilities
4.1. Hyperpresidentialism
The combination of direct presidential legitimacy, political control over the parliamentary majority, broad power of appointment and influence on the judicial career creates a structural risk of concentration. Even when each individual competency appears acceptable, their cumulation can weaken counter-powers.
4.2. The dependence of oversight bodies
An institution cannot be fully independent when its members, budget, career or renewal depend primarily on the authority it must control. The problem concerns constitutional justice, the judiciary, electoral authorities, public media, anti-corruption bodies and sectoral regulators.
4.3. Parliament's weakness
Parliamentary scrutiny may be neutralized when the majority has control over the agenda, the establishment of committees of inquiry, hearings and access to documents. Control must therefore include specific rights belonging to parliamentary minorities, regardless of majority agreement.
4.4. Criminal justice and the risk of instrumentalization
The rule of law requires prosecution to be based on legal, objective and verifiable criteria. The functional autonomy of the prosecutor's office, the career security of judges, the supervision of pretrial detention and the motivation for decisions are essential to prevent the perception or reality of selective justice.
4.5. Crisis situations
Democratic regimes are particularly vulnerable in security, electoral or institutional crises. Exceptional powers, restrictions on demonstrations, numerical limitations and changes in the electoral calendar must remain temporary, necessary, proportionate and controlled by the judge and Parliament.
5. Proposed reform doctrine
The reform should be guided by eight guiding principles:
- Principle of jurisdiction to award — the President's own powers are exhaustively listed.
- Accountability principle — any substantial decision must have an identifiable and politically or legally responsible author.
- Principle of pluralism — No majority should control the bodies responsible for monitoring it alone.
- Principle of justiciability — Constitutional obligations must be invoked before a judge.
- Principle of temporality — exceptional powers and restrictions have a limited duration and automatically expire.
- Principle of transparency — appointments, contracts, assets, financing and decisions are published, unless there is a legitimate and controlled exception.
- Normative subsidiarity principle — the Constitution lays down the essential guarantees; Organic laws organize their implementation; ordinary laws regulate detailed procedures.
- Anti-circumference principle — no reform may favour the incumbent or indirectly empty a guarantee of its substance.
6. Executive Rebalancing
6.1. List the President's own powers
The President should act without counterseing only for powers expressly described as own powers: appointment of the Prime Minister according to the rules of majority, messages to the institutions, referral to the Constitutional Court, referendum under strict conditions and functions of constitutional arbitration. The other acts should be countersigned.
6.2. Giving the Prime Minister effective governmental competence
- Lead Government action.
- Ensure enforcement of laws.
- Exercising the regulatory power of ordinary law.
- Have administration.
- Propose Government appointments.
- Answer before the National Assembly.
6.3. Framework for the revocation of the Prime Minister
The function of Prime Minister cannot be consolidated if the President can terminate it discretionaryly. The resignation should result from a constructive motion of censure, the rejection of a nomination, a voluntary resignation or an established impossibility. Otherwise, the presidential decision should be reasoned and subject to strict constitutional conditions.
6.4. Framework the dissolution of the Assembly
Dissolution should be a mechanism for resolving institutional blockage, not a weapon of political discipline. It should only be possible if it is impossible to form a Government, if there is a persistent budget freeze or if there is a serious crisis. It should be prohibited during the first year of the legislature, the last year of the presidential term, the state of emergency and a procedure of dismissal.
6.5. Effective Presidential Neutrality
The ban on running a party must be aimed at acts, not just titles. It should cover participation in governing bodies, nomination arbitrations, financing, campaign coordination and the use of public resources. A procedure for the determination by the Constitutional Court should be provided for.
7. Parliament and opposition rights
7.1. Investment and Government Responsibility
The Prime Minister should present his program within 15 days. The Assembly would either approve or reject it. To reconcile control and stability, the motion of censure should be constructive: it would only be admissible if it simultaneously proposed a successor.
7.2. Constitutional status of the opposition
- Proportional representation on the Bureau and on committees.
- Chairman of the Finance Committee or of a supervisory committee.
- Annual drawing fee to establish a commission of inquiry.
- Agenda quota reserved.
- Guaranteed speaking time and equitable access to public media.
- A tenth of the deputies referred to the Constitutional Court.
- Access to documents necessary for control.
7.3. Investigative powers and sanctions
Commissions of inquiry must be able to summon public officials, obtain contracts and audits and be assisted by the Court of Auditors. Unwarranted refusal to appear, false testimony or retention of documents should be punished. The opposable secrets must be limited and subject to the supervision of a judge.
7.4. Control of the agenda and legislative procedure
A significant part of the agenda must belong to Parliament. The urgent procedure should be excluded for constitutional revisions, institutional organic laws, electoral texts and laws substantially restricting freedoms.
8. Constitutional Court and Constitutional Review
8.1. A pluralistic appointment
| Designation authority | Proposed number | Guarantee |
|---|---|---|
| President of the Republic | 2 | Reasoned selection of qualified candidates |
| National Assembly | 3 | Three-fifths majority vote after public hearing |
| Judges elected by their peers | 2 | Independent professional representation |
| Law Society and Universities | 1 | Legal competence outside political power |
| Independent institution or Court of Auditors | 1 | Diversification of recruitment |
No authority should be able to appoint a majority alone. Candidates should be subject to a public call, declaration of interest, hearing and public vote. A period of incompatibility should exclude recent politicians.
8.2. Mandate, renewal and autonomy
- Long and non-renewable mandate.
- Third-party renewal.
- Unremovable during the mandate.
- Administrative and budgetary autonomy.
- Deportation rules and prevention of conflicts of interest.
- Full and reasoned publication of decisions.
8.3. Accessible referral
The referral should be open to the President, the Prime Minister, the President of the Assembly, one tenth of the deputies, the Defender of Rights, the electoral authority and ordinary courts. Any litigant should be able to raise a question of constitutionality when a provision applicable to its dispute infringes a guaranteed right.
8.4. Implementation of decisions
The Court's decisions must be binding on all authorities. The Court should be able to set a time limit for enforcement, order the necessary measures and publicly declare a failure to comply. Deliberate enforcement of a constitutional decision should constitute a serious breach that could result in the author's liability.
9. Independence and efficiency of justice
9.1. Reform the Higher Council of the Judiciary
The Supreme Council of the Judiciary must guarantee judicial independence, not an extension of the Executive. Its majority should be composed of judges elected by their peers, supplemented by lawyers, academics and independent personalities. The President and the Minister of Justice should not participate in individual decisions on appointment, deployment, promotion or discipline.
| Proposed component | Indicative number | Role |
|---|---|---|
| Magistrates of the elected seat | 4 | Protection of the independence of the judgement |
| Prosecutors elected | 2 | Taking account of the specificities of public action |
| Lawyer appointed by the Bar | 1 | Opening on the rights of the defence |
| University of Law | 1 | Doctrinal and comparative expertise |
| Independent persons elected by the qualified majority assembly | 2 | Pluralism and democratic accountability |
| Heads of Supreme Courts | Legally supervised members | Institutional continuity |
9.2. Conforming opinions and career security
Appointments and transfers of magistrates should be made on the basis of a proposal or assent of the Council. Any unauthorized transfer should be exceptional, reasoned and subject to appeal. Disciplinary procedures must be contradictory and decisions must be reasoned.
9.3. Functional autonomy of the parquet
The Minister of Justice could define general guidelines for criminal policy, both written and public, but no investigation should be directed at an individual case. Prosecutors should be appointed according to transparent criteria, with the Council's assent, for sufficiently protected mandates.
9.4. Effective and accessible justice
- Constitutional right to a decision within a reasonable time.
- Judge of freedoms and independent detention.
- Periodic monitoring and capping of pretrial detention.
- Access to counsel from the beginning of custody.
- Emergency procedures for fundamental freedoms.
- Multiannual programming of the means of justice.
- Free and anonymous publication of decisions.
- Secure digitization and traceability of procedures.
- Compensation mechanism for excessive duration.
9.5. Accountability and integrity of justice
Independence does not mean no responsibility. Ethics rules, declarations of interest, disciplinary procedures and complaint mechanisms must be transparent, impartial and compatible with the independence of the judgement.
10. Elections, public freedoms and crisis powers
10.1. Constitutionally protected electoral authority
- Multiparty composition and public appointment procedure.
- Independent budget.
- Control of the electoral register.
- Publication of results by office.
- Direct referral to the Constitutional Court.
- Secured access to necessary administrations and data.
- Mandates protected and inconsistent with the presidential mandate.
10.2. Stability of electoral law
The fundamental elements of electoral law should not be changed within 12 months of a vote, unless there is a strong consensus or constitutional need. This rule should cover the method of voting, the conditions of candidature, sponsorship, the composition of the electoral authority and the division of constituencies.
10.3. Exceptional powers
The state of emergency and exceptional powers must be strictly limited in time. Any extension beyond 15 or 30 days should be authorized by the Assembly and controlled by the Constitutional Court. Certain guarantees must never be suspended: dignity, prohibition of torture, criminal legality, rights of defence, recourse to detention and independence of the judiciary.
10.4. Digital freedoms
General Internet cuts should be prohibited. Any targeted restriction must be provided by law, necessary, proportionate, time-limited, motivated and subject to immediate judicial review. The right of access to public information should be constitutionally recognized and implemented by an independent authority.
10.5. Public media and pluralism
The leaders of the public media and the regulatory authority should be appointed in a pluralistic manner. Broadcast time, coverage criteria and sanctions should be published. The public service mission must be protected from political and financial dependence.
11. Transparency, public resources and accountability
11.1. Strategic contracts and natural resources
Parliament's information is a first step. The most important conventions should be subject to prior authorization or ratification. Contracts, amendments, beneficial owners, sovereign guarantees, tax advantages and performance reports should be published, subject to narrow exceptions controlled by the judge.
11.2. Court of Auditors
- Certification of State accounts.
- Control of enterprises and public funds.
- Direct transmission to the Public Prosecutor ' s Office of criminal offences.
- Assistance to parliamentary committees.
- Full publication of reports.
- Public follow-up of recommendations and responses from administrations.
11.3. Appointments to independent institutions
Control or regulatory functions should not be subject to discretionary presidential appointment. Nominations should be public, competencies checked, open hearings and the most sensitive appointments approved by qualified majority.
11.4. Heritage, interests and anti-corruption
High-level officials should file statements of assets and interests upon entering, leaving and leaving office. An independent authority should monitor unexplained variations, have access to the necessary information and transmit the anomalies directly to the prosecutor.
12. Financing of political parties and neutralization of electoral clientelism
12.1. A historical blind spot
Since independence, the financing of Senegalese political life has largely been based on the contributions of executives and elected officials, reporting networks and private funding that cannot be traced. The prolonged absence of effective public funding and a monitoring body has fueled a persistent electoral clientele: the distribution of donations in cash or in kind, the provision of individual needs for political support, and the dependence of candidates on private donors whose influence is beyond the control of citizens. Act No. 81-17 of 6 May 1981 on political parties, which is still in force, prohibits foreign subsidies, but has never organized substantial public financing or an independent monitoring and deterrent mechanism.
12.2. A real but unfinished advance in the preliminary draft of 2026
The preliminary draft law on political parties released on 27 April 2026 introduces, for the first time, public funding of parties (art. 21) and sets out the conditions for access to it (art. 22): from 2028 onwards, only those parties which have obtained at least 5 per cent of the votes in the presidential election, one member of the National Assembly or 0.25 per cent of the local councillors could benefit from it. The text prohibits anonymous or occult donations, financing from legal entities governed by public law other than the State, cryptocurrency financing and foreign subsidies (Article 20), and requires the annual transmission of certified financial statements to the Court of Auditors (Article 27), subject to administrative suspension (Article 29).
Limits identified
This mechanism marks a step forward in principle, but is still insufficient to neutralize electoral clientelism for four reasons. First, the postponement of the entry into force to 2028 leaves an entire electoral cycle without operating public funding, during which current practices continue. Secondly, the threshold of eligibility (5% in the presidential elections, a seat for a deputy or 0.25 % of local councillors) may freeze the partisan landscape by permanently excluding new, emerging or emerging opposition formations. — an effect already observed and criticized in democracies with comparable thresholds. Thirdly, the control entrusted to the Minister of the Interior for the administrative suspension remains a control of the Executive over its political competitors, rather than an independent control. Fourthly, the text does not set any limits on private donations of natural persons or campaign expenses, nor does it explicitly address the purchase of votes or the distribution of goods during campaigns, which constitute the most direct manifestation of electoral clientelism.
12.3. Comparative constitutional benchmark
Several democracies with well-recognized electoral institutions have built, through successive scandals, financing schemes combining substantial public financing, strict capping of private financing, real-time transparency and truly independent oversight of the Executive.
| Country | Background | Public financing | Private supervision | Supervisory body |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Germany | Art. 21 Basic law + Parteiengesetz (1967) | Legal global ceiling (190 M€) ; calculated according to the electoral anchor and contributions; cannot exceed the party's own resources (50 % rule) | Unlimited donations but mandatory reporting over 10,000 € ; immediate publication beyond 35 000 € ; anonymous donations prohibited beyond a low threshold | President of the Bundestag + Federal Constitutional Court; full online publication |
| France | Constitution (art. 4) + Electoral Code + 1988-1995-2017 Laws | Annual budget support (-) 66 M€) according to election results and parity of candidatures | Total ban on donations of legal persons since 1995; donations of natural persons capped at 7,500 €/year; ceiling for campaign expenditure with conditional reimbursement | National Commission on Campaign Accounts and Political Financing (CNCCFP), independent administrative authority |
| Costa Rica | Constitution, article 96 | « Deuda política » : State contribution capped at a percentage of GDP, reimbursed after the election in proportion to the votes obtained, subject to a threshold of 4% of the vote | Private donations authorized but subject to the principle of advertising; full justification of expenses before the election authority before reimbursement | Supreme Court of Elecciones (TSE), independent electoral court with constitutional rank |
| South Africa | Constitution + Political Party Funding Act, 2018 | Fund of represented parties (proportional to results) + Multi-stakeholder Fund for Mutualized Private Financing | Ceiling of donations per source (15 million rands/year); mandatory disclosure beyond 100 000 rands; ban on donations from public entities, public enterprises and foreign governments | Electoral Commission (IEC), independent constitutional authority, with powers of investigation and sanction |
| Senegalese preliminary project (2026) | Ordinary Law on Political Parties | Public funding from 2028 onwards, subject to electoral thresholds | Prohibition of occult, foreign and public legal donations; no ceiling on donations by natural persons or on campaign expenses | Minister of the Interior (administrative suspension) + Court of Auditors (ex post audit) |
12.4. Recommendations to neutralize electoral clientelism
- Advance entry into force public funding in the next legislature, without waiting for 2028, to avoid an entire electoral cycle without an operating framework.
- Combine an equal and proportional share in the distribution of public funding, in order to support emerging parties without freezing the partisan landscape around the already represented parties.
- Plafing donations from natural persons by donor and per year, and confirm the total prohibition of any donation of legal persons, public or private.
- Placing campaign expenses by type of election, with public reimbursement conditional on the certification of the accounts, on the French and Costa Rican model.
- Explicitly sanction the purchase of votes and the distribution of donations in cash or in kind during the campaigns, with the termination of the mandate and temporary ineligibility, beyond the only administrative sanctions on party financing.
- Providing oversight to a truly independent body Executive — the future National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) or an autonomous commission inspired by the CNCCFP — rather than the Minister of the Interior, for suspension of funding and sanctions.
- Impose transparency in real time : public register of donors beyond a threshold, quarterly publication during election periods, and not only the annual certification a posteriori.
- Ensuring equitable access to public media and State-funded campaigning facilities, in order to reduce the dependence of applicants on private customer networks.
13. Review procedure and anti-circumvention guarantees
12.1. Enhanced deliberation
Any revision should be subject to two readings separated by a minimum delay, an explanatory report, an institutional impact assessment, public hearings and a qualified majority. The emergency procedure should be excluded.
12.2. Referendum for fundamental balances
A referendum should be mandatory when the revision affects the duration or number of mandates, the mode of election of the President, the independence of the judiciary, the presidential powers, the fundamental rights or the architecture of the Constitutional Court.
12.3. Mandatory prior checking
The Constitutional Court should verify compliance with the procedure, the clauses of intangibility, democratic alternation and the absence of constitutional fraud. Revisions should never produce a personal benefit to the Chairman-in-Office.
12.4. Responsibility of the President
The grounds for dismissal should be defined: serious and manifest violation of the Constitution, obstruction of a decision of the Court, corruption, misappropriation, infringement of electoral sincerity, unlawful retention of power or systematic violation of fundamental rights. The procedure must involve parliamentary initiative, reinforced majority, adversarial investigation and reasoned judicial decision.
14. Proposals for constitutional drafting
The following wordings are working clauses. They should be harmonized with the numbering and terminology of the final text.
Own powers and counterseing« The President of the Republic shall exercise without prejudice only the powers expressly described by the Constitution as own powers. Any other act shall be countersigned by the Prime Minister and, where appropriate, by the ministers responsible. »
Government Directorate« The Prime Minister directs the action of the Government, enforces the laws, exercises the regulatory power subject to the powers expressly assigned to the President of the Republic and has the administration. The Government is accountable to the National Assembly. »
Motion for constructive censorship« The National Assembly can only question the responsibility of the Government by a motion of censure designating a candidate for the office of Prime Minister. The motion was adopted by an absolute majority of the members of the Assembly. »
Boxed Dissolution« Dissolution may be pronounced only in the event of a serious and persistent blockage of the functioning of the institutions, after consultation with the Prime Minister and the President of the National Assembly and after public notice of the Constitutional Court. The decision shall state the reasons. »
Opposition« The parliamentary opposition contributes to the functioning of democracy and the control of government action. It enjoys its own rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the Organic Law, which cannot be subordinated to the agreement of the majority. »
Judicial independence« The judicial authority is independent of the executive and legislative branches. The Supreme Council of the Judiciary guarantees this independence. The majority of its members are elected by the judiciary in a manner that ensures pluralism and balanced representation of functions. »
Prosecutor ' s Office« The general guidelines for criminal policy are written and public. No instruction may be sent to the Public Prosecutor in an individual procedure. Prosecutors perform their functions in accordance with the law, impartiality and functional independence. »
Constitutional decisions« The decisions of the Constitutional Court are binding on all public, administrative and judicial authorities. Any authority shall take the measures necessary for their implementation within the prescribed period. »
Internet and communications« No general interruption of access to the Internet or electronic communications services may be ordered. Any targeted restriction must be provided by law, necessary, proportionate, time-limited and subject to immediate judicial review. »
Strategic public contracts« Contracts, agreements, licences and concessions relating to natural resources or creating a substantial financial commitment to the State shall be published and, in cases defined by the Organic Law, subject to prior authorization by the National Assembly. »
Anti-opportunistic review« Any change in the duration, number or regime for the computation of presidential mandates may not apply to the current mandate or provide an advantage to the incumbent. »
Financing of political parties« The law guarantees public funding for political parties, combining an equal share and a proportional share of election results. Donations by legal persons are prohibited. Donations from individuals and campaign expenses are capped by the Organic Law. Any occult donation or distribution of gifts in cash or in kind for the purpose of obtaining a vote shall be punished by the revocation of the mandate and the ineligibility, without prejudice to criminal proceedings. Control of the financing of political parties is entrusted to an independent executive authority. »
Reasonable time« Everyone has the right to a fair, public and reasonable hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. »
15. Action plan and prioritization matrix
15.1. Minimum package to be integrated immediately
- Pluralization of the appointment of constitutional judges.
- Reform of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary.
- Prohibition of individual instructions at the public prosecutor ' s office.
- Clear Government responsibility and constructive motion of censure.
- Dissolution framed and controlled.
- Own rights of opposition.
- Parliamentary oversight of strategic appointments.
- Automatic control of exceptional powers and digital breaches.
- Progress and ceiling on the financing of political parties under independent control.
15.2. Implementation matrix
| Measure | Normative | Horizon | Senior Manager | Indicator |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Own powers of the President and counterseing | Constitution | Immediate action | Component | Comprehensive list and countersigned acts |
| Investigative and constructive censorship | Constitution + organic law | Immediate action | Constituent / Assembly | Operational procedure |
| Status of opposition | Constitution + Rules of Procedure | 0-6 months | Assembly | Drawing rights and actual presidencies |
| Constitutional Court | Constitution + organic law | 0-6 months | Presidency / Assembly / Professional bodies | Public hearings and qualified appointments |
| Reform of the MSC | Constitution + organic law | 0-9 months | Ministry of Justice / Judiciary | Majority of independent members |
| Autonomy of the Public Prosecutor ' s Office | Constitution + Code of Criminal Procedure | 0-12 months | Justice / Parliament | General instructions published, no individual instruction |
| Judge of Freedoms and Detention | Organic law / CPC | 0-12 months | Justice | Rapid monitoring of detentions |
| Independent Electoral Authority | Constitution + Electoral Code | 0-9 months | Parliament | Budget, file and published results |
| Transparency of contracts | Organic law + ordinary law | 0-12 months | Finance / Parliament / Court of Auditors | Public register of contracts |
| Public funding of parties, ceilings and independent control | Constitution + Organic Law on Political Parties | 0-9 months | Parliament / CENI / Court of Auditors | Advanced entry into force, ceilings set, donor register published |
| Heritage declarations | Organic law | 0-12 months | Anti-corruption authority | Deposit rates and published controls |
| Access to information | Constitution + law | 0-12 months | Government / independent authority | Deadlines for reply and appeals |
| Publication of court decisions | Law/Regulation | 0-18 months | Ministry of Justice | Public case law base |
15.3. Three-year success indicators
- Proportion of appointments to independent institutions preceded by a public call and hearing.
- Number of applications to the Constitutional Court by the opposition and litigants.
- Rates of execution of Court decisions within time limits.
- Average time for civil, criminal and administrative proceedings.
- Share of pre-trial detentions and median duration.
- Number of commissions of inquiry initiated by minorities.
- Rate of publication of strategic contracts and their amendments.
- Publication by office of election results.
- Number and duration of digital restrictions, with corresponding court decisions.
- Rates of implementation of the Court of Auditors' recommendations.
- Number of new or emerging parties that have accessed public funding.
- Number of effective sanctions for buying votes or occult financing.
16. Conclusion and Republican appeal
Constitutional reform is a rare opportunity to consolidate the national pact. It must not only redistribute skills among current managers; It must organise long-term alternation, protect freedoms, make justice independent and enable institutions to effectively control power.
A Constitution of reasonable mistrust
Senegal would benefit from adopting a Constitution of reasonable distrust: not a Constitution hostile to power, but a Constitution aware that any power tends to expand when it is not limited. The loyalty of rulers is desirable; robust guarantees are essential.
This contribution calls for a calm, documented and inclusive debate involving majority, opposition, judiciary, bar, academics, local authorities, trade unions, civil society organizations, diaspora, youth and citizens. The aim is not to weaken the state, but to make it more legitimate, effective and resilient.
Appendix 1. Amendment assessment grid
This grid can be applied systematically to each provision of the final parliamentary text, to verify that it constitutes a real guarantee and not an announcement effect.
| Question | Yes / No | Observation |
|---|---|---|
| Is competence precisely defined? | — | — |
| Is the competent authority identifiable? | — | — |
| Is there an adversarial procedure? | — | — |
| Is a deadline fixed? | — | — |
| Is there a judicial remedy? | — | — |
| Is there a penalty for violations? | — | — |
| Can the opposition or the minority activate the mechanism? | — | — |
| Is the mechanism still effective if the President controls the majority? | — | — |
| Do the appointment rules avoid capture? | — | — |
| Is the mechanism financially and administratively autonomous? | — | — |
Appendix 2. Recommended distribution by normative level
| Constitution | Organic law | Ordinary law / regulation |
|---|---|---|
| Powers of the President; Government responsibility; dissolution; independence of justice; opposition rights; principles of the Constitutional Court; crisis powers; electoral guarantees | Composition and functioning of the Court and the CMS; the status of judges; Constitutional referral; powers of committees; status of the opposition; removal | Criminal procedure; detention; access to information; contracts and contracts; heritage; political financing; publication of decisions; Alert launchers |
Appendix 3. Main sources and references
- Presidency of the Republic of Senegal. Communiqué on the public availability of the four draft reforms, 27 April 2026. President.sn
- Public life Senegal. Draft law amending the Constitution of Senegal, 27 April 2026. public life.sn
- Public life Senegal. Draft Organic Law on the Constitutional Court, 27 April 2026. public life.sn
- Constitutional Council of Senegal / Public Life. Decision No. 4/C/2026 on the draft constitutional revision. public life.sn
- Republic of Senegal. Draft law amending the Constitution — full text. jubbanti.sec.gouv.sn
- Venice Commission. The Updated Rule of Law Checklist, CDL-AD(2025)002, December 2025. Coe.int
- International IDEA. Presidential Legislative Powers: Constitution-Building Primer. idea.int
- International IDEA. Dissolution of Parliament: Constitution-Building Primer. idea.int
- International IDEA. Opposition and Legislative Minorities: Constitutional Roles, Rights and Recognition. idea.int
- United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Basic principles of judicial independence. ohchr.org
- United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Guidelines for the role of prosecutors. ohchr.org
- African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. Guidelines on Access to Information and Elections in Africa. achpr.au.int
- Venice Commission. Code of Conduct for Elections. venice.coe.int
Methodological note — This is a constitutional policy contribution. It does not constitute an individual legal consultation. References to the 2026 draft should be reconciled with the most recent parliamentary text and the Official Journal. The comparative proposals are adapted to the Senegalese context and do not recommend the mechanical transposition of a foreign model.
Appendix 4. Benchmark for financing political parties — sources and access links
Official documents and texts used as the basis for the comparative constitutional benchmark presented in section 12.
- Senegal — Republic of Senegal. Draft law on political parties, 27 April 2026 (Articles 20-29 on financing). jubbanti.sec.gouv.sn
- Senegal — Public life Senegal. Act No. 81-17 of 6 May 1981 on political parties. public life.sn
- Germany — German Bundestag. Party Funding. bundestag. of the
- Germany — Bundesministerium des Innern. Funding of Political Parties. Bmi.bund. of the
- France — National Assembly. Fact Sheet No. 4: Financing political life: parties and election campaigns. assemblye-nationale.fr
- France — National Commission on Campaign Accounts and Political Financing (CNCCFP). Guide to the use of candidates and their agents, edition 2025-2026. cnccfp.fr
- Costa Rica — Constitución Política de la República de Costa Rica, article 96 (public financing of parties). cervantesvirtual.com
- Costa Rica — Supreme Court of Elecciones. Note tecnica on the « deuda política ». tse.go.cr
- South Africa — Government of the Republic of South Africa Political Party Funding Act 6 of 2018, official text. gov.za
- South Africa — The Presidency. President Ramaphosa signs Political Party Funding Act into operation. thepresidency.gov.za
- Comparison Africa — AFIDEP. Political party financing in West Africa: Democratic transparency or entrenched clientelism? afidep.org
- Senegalese context — Young Africa. Senegal: Financing political parties, a taboo subject. youngafrican.com
