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The Western powers, particularly the United States, are willing to present themselves as the guardians of democracy, human rights and international order.
They denounce authoritarian regimes, stigmatize massive violations of freedoms and brandish international law as a moral compass of the international community.
Yet when we observe the long history of international relations since 1945, a more disturbing reality appears: Many of the regimes that the West today dedicated to gemonies were yesterday supported, armed, financed, tolerated, covered or indirectly produced by the same powers. And when these regimes cease to be useful, they suddenly become the incarnations of evil that they claim to fight. FromIran to Guatemala, Chile toIraq, the Libya to Cuba, is emerging a recurring mechanics : State reason produces monsters that she then denounces in the name of morality.
In this theatre, the UN is regularly accused of impotence, even though the veto architecture allows the dominant powers to neutralize the consistent application of the law they invoke elsewhere.
Recent developments Venezuela, in Iran and around Cuba give this contradiction a new acuity.
Western death angle: the effects are condemned without assuming the causes
The first weakness of the Western narrative lies in its amnesia character. Western chancelleries speak of dictatorships as if they were purely internal pathologies, born of a local deviation, a defective political culture or a democratic backwardness peculiar to the societies concerned.
This reading is convenient, but it is incomplete. An authoritarian regime is almost never born alone. It emerges in a context of social fractures, external interference, economic dependence, militarization of state apparatus and cold war or war strategies of influence.
The problem is therefore not only that the West sometimes supports autocrats; The problem is that he then presents himself as the moral judge of political orders, whose trajectories he has often helped to lock.
In this perspective, Western denunciation of tyranny appears less as a universal doctrine than as a selective practice. Principles do not disappear, but they are prioritized by strategic interest.
As long as a regime guarantees access to resources, functional regional stability, security cooperation or geopolitical alignment, its authoritarianism is relativized.
When he becomes hostile, unpredictable or useless, he is requalified as a civilizational threat.
This slide of vocabulary is not anecdotal: it allows to turn an old complacency into a moral crusade.
Iran: Islamic Republic as paradoxical child of the 1953 coup d'état
LIran is probably one of the most educational cases in this history. In 1953, the declassified U.S. archives explicitly showed the preparation and implementation of clandestine actions against the Mohammad Mossadegh, in the context of the oil conflict and Western fear of Iran's strategic shift. Documents FRUS on TPAJAX and the national security discussions clearly state that Washington and London were not mere observers for the overthrow of Mossadegh. They took part in replacing a nationalist government with an order more compatible with their interests.
The Shah, resettled to the center of the game, was then long presented as a modernising, rational and stable ally. But this stability was a surface stability. It was based on a hard security apparatus, a social concentration of wealth, a Westernization often experienced as imposed from above, and a deep national resentment linked to the humiliation of the overthrow of Mossadegh.
When 1979 Revolution It bursts, it is not simply the eruption of sudden obscurantism. It is also the historical revenge of a society that has seen its sovereignty upset by an alliance between authoritarian monarchy and external powers.. The tragedy is that this revolt was finally captured by a repressive theocracy.
The West therefore did not mechanically "create" the ayatollah regime; But it has powerfully helped to destroy the conditions for a credible nationalist, constitutional and democratic alternative.
This genealogy should impose more caution in the current Western rhetoric about Iran. The recent sequence goes in the opposite direction. Reuters reported at the end of February 2026 that there was an environment of military threats and intense sanctions around the Iranian case, before the open escalation of late February and 1 March 2026, marked by American and Israeli strikes and further regional degradation.
The paradox is constant: in the name of support for the Iranian people, a framework of confrontation is produced that strengthens the regime's security logics, reduces the space of autonomous civilian forces and promotes internal siege dynamics.
Iraq: From useful partner to absolute monster
Iraq provides a second major example of this Moral plasticity. Historical American documents show that in the late 1970s, Saddam Hussein was already fully identified as the strong man of the Iraqi regime. During the Iran-Iraq warThe United States gradually re-engaged its relationship with Baghdad, not because the regime was frequentable in a political or ethical sense, but because it served as a balance against revolutionary Iran. This logic of "stability through the worst" is at the heart of the international practice of the great powers.
Then the relationship turns around. After invasion of KuwaitSaddam is again becoming the priority enemy.
Finally, in 2003, the United States invaded Iraq without the explicit mandate they would have wanted from the Security Council. Kofi Annan Then qualify the illegal war under the Charter.
In a few years, the previously tolerated and then contained regime becomes the justification for a war presented as a civilizing one. But this war has disarticulated the Iraqi state, aggravated denominational fragmentation, opened huge spaces to militias, regional interference and jihadism.
The Iraqi sequence reveals a brutal truth: Western politics is not just changing enemies, it often changes arguments along the way.
Latin America: the historical laboratory of the double standard
If we had to identify the geopolitical space where this contradiction is most documented, it would beLatin America. To GuatemalaThe US official archives describe PBSUCCESS as the CIA operation that led to the 1954 coup d'état against Jacobo Árbenz.
Moreover, some documents explained the objective of "installing and supporting" a pro-American government. The bureaucratic language here is a remarkable franchise: we are no longer in abstraction of principles, but in the engineering assumed of regime change.
The Chile offers another classic case. Declassified archivesOffice of the Historic show black on white that it was "firm and continuous politics" thatAllende be overthrown by a coup, ensuring that "the American hand remains well hidden". The formula is crucial, as it summarizes the essence of many external operations: to act decisively and then to organize the invisibility of action.
Democracy is then defended not against dictatorship, but against the possibility of a people making a political choice contrary to Washington's strategic preferences. The problem is not just the blow itself; This is the break between proclaimed universalism and the clandestineity of practice.
This Latin American history partly explains the profound distrust of a part of the global South with regard to Western humanitarian and democratic vocabulary.
When a single actor supports juntas, finances destabilizations, and then invokes human rights to justify new pressures, it destroys its own normative credibility. The Western word continues to have power, but it has lost an essential part of its innocence.
Cuba: embargo as punishment of the people and political rent of the regime
Cuba Another variant of the same problem is not direct support for an autocrat allied, but rather direct support for autocrats.a prolonged coercion which eventually nourishes the hardening of the regime which she claims to weaken. The history of the island is inseparable from the attempt to overthrow the Castroin particular with the Bay of Pigs, then the installation of a structural embargo became one of the longest coercive mechanisms in contemporary history.
Recent evidence shows that this logic remains. In October 2025, the United Nations General Assembly again, by a very large majority, condemned the American embargo against Cuba, with 165 votes in favour for the resolution calling for its lifting, against 7 votes against and 12 abstentions. In November 2025, a United Nations human rights expert found that these sanctions severely degrade access to health, food, education and living conditions on the island. In February 2026, Reuters further reported that Washington had described Cuba as a "extraordinary" threat to national security and threatened the island's fuel suppliers, as a continuation of the capture of Maduro and the drying up of Venezuelan flows.
The political effect of this strategy has been known for decades: The embargo impoverishes society, allows the Cuban power to mobilize besieged rhetoric, outsources part of internal responsibilities and complicates the emergence of autonomous counter-powers.
It does not exonerate the structural shortcomings of the Cuban regime; But it creates an environment where the collective punishment of the people becomes the ordinary language of a foreign policy presented as democratic.
Libya and Syria: When intervention destroys trust in law
Libyan case has produced lasting normative damage. Security Council resolution 1973 authorized measures to protect civilians and the establishment of a no-fly zone. Formally, the text fell within the classical language of protection. Politically, however, a large part of the world considered that its execution had overflowed the strict framework of protection to slide towards a de facto regime change. It was this perception, even more so than the text itself, that then rigidized the positions of several permanent members in other theatres, including Syria.
In Syriathe Security Council has become the emblematic place of veto paralysis. United Nations surveys and follow-up Security Council Report demonstrate how repeated blockages have prevented a coherent response on the humanitarian, political and security front. The crucial point here is institutional: the great powers often blame the United Nations for its impotence, whereas this impotence derives precisely from a system in which they have reserved a decisive blocking power. They produce inertia which they then denounce.
UN and international law: an order that the powerful invoke without subjecting themselves to it
The legal heart of the problem lies in the very architecture of the Charter. Rule 27 organizes the vote in the Security Council by requiring the assistance of permanent members for substantive decisions. In practice, this means thatno serious measure can prosper against the fundamental interests of the great powers or their protected. This mechanism is not an accident; It is the institutional translation of the 1945 power ratio.
The United Nations is therefore not ineffective in nature. It is intermittent because it depends on the will to limit the most powerful.
As long as permanent members agree to contain themselves, the right has a chance.
Instead, when they want to preserve their freedom of action, the legal order becomes a selective repertoire of arguments. António Guterres The Charter is not an "à la carte" menu. This formula is a general diagnosis of contemporary disorder. Universal principles continue to be proclaimed; but their implementation remains hierarchical, opportunistic and deeply asymmetrical.
Venezuela in 2026: sovereignty under de facto administration
Recent developments in Venezuela are further radicalizing this contradiction. Reuters reported that Nicolas Maduro was captured during an American operation on 3 January 2026, transferred to New York and charged in US criminal proceedings. On the same day, Reuters also referred to an American will to "administer" the Venezuelan transition to a passage deemed safe and orderly.
Other dispatches highlighted the legal challenges raised by the operation, including its compatibility with international law and the principle of sovereignty.
It is necessary to be precise: Maduro's regime was already widely contested for its authoritarian drifts, disastrous economic management, political repression and violations of freedoms. But the question is not his innocence; It is the same as the previous one.
When a great power arrogates the right to capture in the territory of another State a current or recently deposited Head of State and then to insert it into its own judiciary, it asserts de facto that a certain category of sovereignty can be suspended by geopolitical decision. International law then ceases to be a common rule; it becomes a variable grammar of legitimation of power.
Hypocrisy is not an accident: it is a method of international government
What strikes, when these cases end up, is not the existence of point contradictions. It's their rehearsal.
We support a strong man because he's useful.
We weaken an elected government because it worries.
A people is punished to put pressure on their regime.
The right is invoked when the adversary violates him.
It is interpreted flexibly when the ally, or self, deviates.
Then the United Nations is accused of impotence, even though it has the tools to neutralize it.
The decisive diplomatic point is that this hypocrisy is not only moral; It is structural. It is due to the combination of three elements..
First, strategic interests take precedence over normative coherence.
Then, historical memory is fragmented Each intervention is presented as a new crisis, detached from previous responsibilities.
Finally, the international communication constantly requalifies the same practices according to the status of the actor concerned : legitimate violence here, illegal aggression there; responsible punishment here, collective punishment there; protection of civilians here, interference there.
This semantic instability undermines global confidence in Western universalism.
As long as the powerful do the law, they will still pretend to speak in the name of law
Perhaps the great tragedy of the contemporary international order is this: law has never been so invoked, but rarely so visibly subordinated to power. The Western states, and especially the United States, are not the only ones who practice this selectivity. Other powers also do.
But the West bears a special burden of coherence because it continues to present itself as the normative centre of the international system.
It is precisely for this reason that its contradictions are so visible and destructive.
LIran recalls that past interference can fuel future oppression.
LIraq shows that a useful ally can become a tyrant to shoot as soon as it leaves the perimeter of interest.
Cuba proves that a prolonged strangulation strategy can harden the regime that it claims to bring down while crushing the population.
The Libya and Syria demonstrate that the instrumentalization or paralysis of the UN framework destroys confidence in the very idea of a universal right.
The VenezuelaFinally, reveals how far the contemporary temptation of conditional sovereignty administered by the strongest can go.
The question therefore is not whether authoritarian regimes should be denounced. Of course they must be. The real question is who helped them to be born, to endure, to militarize, to radicalize or to legitimize themselves..
As long as this genealogy is hidden, Western denunciation will remain partially inaudible in much of the world. And As long as the great powers simultaneously want to retain the privilege of strength and the monopoly of moral discourse, the United Nations will continue to be accused of impotence for failures whose powerful are themselves the main architects.
In essence, the current international disorder is not only due to the brutality of dictatorships. It also comes from the opportunistic use that the dominant powers make of the principles that they claim to defend.
When a world order starts punishing the weak in the name of law and excuses the strong in the name of stability, it no longer produces legitimacy. It produces resentment, distrust and, ultimately, a shift towards an implicit norm much older than the Charter of the United Nations: no longer the common rule, but the law of the strongest.
Sources
| No | Source | Nature | Operational summary | Access |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Office of the Historian – FRUS, Iran 1952–1954, doc. 170 | Official American Archive | Key document on the CIA's clandestine capabilities in Iran ahead of Mossadegh's overthrow. It sheds light on the mechanics of interference, propaganda relays, security contacts and the logic of political destabilization. | https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran/d170 |
| 2 | Office of the Historic – FRUS, Guatemala 1952–1954, volume "Sources" | Official American Archive | Documentary front door on Operation PBSUCCESS and the coup d'état against Jacobo Árbenz. A useful source for anchoring the analysis of Washington-supported regime changes in Latin America. | https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/sources |
| 3 | Office of the Historic – FRUS, Chile 1969–1973, Doc. 154 | Official American Archive | A reference document on American policy towards Chile in Germany. It shows the strategic will to promote a reversal, while concealing the direct role of the United States. | https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d154 |
| 4 | Office of the Historic – FRUS, Iraq 1977–1980, doc. 139 | Official American Archive | Source useful to situate Saddam Hussein as a central player in the Iraqi regime before the Iran-Iraq war, and to understand the American pragmatic re-engagement towards Baghdad. | https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d139 |
| 5 | UN – Repertory of Practice, Article 27 of the Charter | United Nations legal source | Expects the functioning of the vote in the Security Council and the legal scope of the veto of permanent members. An indispensable basis for analysing the structural paralysis of the UN system. | https://legal.un.org/repertory/art27.shtml |
| 6 | UN Security Council – Resolution 1973 on Libya | UN normative text | Founding text of the 2011 intervention in Libya, focusing on the protection of civilians and the no-fly zone. | https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/s/res/1973-%282011%29 |
| 7 | Security Council Report – Syria / UN Documents | United Nations Documentation Database | Aggregate resolutions, declarations and reports on Syria. Very useful in documenting repeated blockages, humanitarian sequences and the effects of the veto on conflict management. | https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/syria/?utm source=chatgpt.com |
| 8 | Reuters – Guterres: the Charter is not "à la carte" | International News Agency | Recent article echoing the Secretary-General's warning on the selective use of the Charter of the United Nations. To support the idea of an international law invoked in an opportunistic manner. | https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-chief-warns-80-year-old-funding-charter-not-an-la-carte-menu-2025-06-26/ |
| 9 | Reuters – American Strikes Against Iran, 28 February 2026 | International News Agency | Source of updates on American-Iranian climbing and the risks of regional explosion. It allows the Iranian historical analysis to be included in the most recent context. | https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trumps-iran-strikes-mark-his-biggest-foreign-policy-gamble-2026-02-28/ |
| 10 | Reuters – UN General Assembly vote on the embargo against Cuba, 29 October 2025 | International News Agency | Summarizes the UN vote condemning once again the US embargo against Cuba, with the details of the vote. Very useful to show Washington's diplomatic isolation on this point. | https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-fails-make-big-dent-un-vote-calling-end-cuba- embargo-2025-10-29/ |
| 11 | Reuters – UN expert on sanctions against Cuba, 21 November 2025 | International News Agency | Document the concrete effects of sanctions on living conditions in Cuba from a human rights perspective. Important source for the argument on collective punishment of populations. | https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/un-human-rights-expert-urges-us-lift-sanctions-cuba-2025-11-21/ |
| 12 | Reuters – Critical Energy Situation in Cuba, February 9, 2026 | International News Agency | Lights up the worsening economic pressure on Cuba and threats to the island's energy flows. Serves to link embargo, energy coercion and recent geopolitical hardening. | https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/kremlin-says-fuel-situation-cuba-is-critical-criticists-us-blockade-2026-02-09/ |
| 13 | Reuters – Maduro capture and American will to "manage" Venezuela, 3 January 2026 | International News Agency | Central source for the recent sequence in Venezuela. It describes the American operation, the capture of Maduro and the willingness assumed to administer the transition. | https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/loud-noisees-heard-venuela-capital-southern-area-without-electricity-2026-01-03/ |
| 14 | Reuters – Legality of Maduro capture, 3 January 2026 | International News Agency | Legal analysis of the challenges raised by the US operation in Venezuela. Very useful for discussing sovereignty, extraterritoriality and international precedent. | https://www.reuters.com/world/us/was-us-capture-venezuelas-president-legal-2026-01-03/ |
| 15 | Reuters/Gulf News – Kofi Annan: Iraq's war was illegal | Press / Reuters takeover | Resumes Kofi Annan's famous statement that the 2003 invasion of Iraq violated the UN Charter. Source useful to situate the gap between proclaimed law and actual practice. | https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/un-chief-annan-says-iraq-war-illegal-1.332720?utm source=chatgpt.com |
| 16 | Office of the Historic – Bay of Pigs Invasion and its Aftermath | Official synthetic historical source | Structured presentation of the invasion of the Bay of Pigs and its suites. Allows US policy towards Cuba to be included in an old logic of regime change. | https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/bay-of-pigs?utm source=chatgpt.com |
| 17 | UN – Press release on the 2025 vote on the embargo against Cuba | Official UN communiqué | Institutional version of the General Assembly vote on the embargo. Source particularly useful. | https://press.un.org/en/2025/ga12723.doc.htm?utm source=chatgpt.com |
| 18 | EU – Explanation of vote on the embargo against Cuba, 29 October 2025 | European institutional source | The European position that the embargo is detrimental to the Cuban economy and the standard of living of the population is expressed. Completes the UN and Latin American perspective. | https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-explanation-vote-united-nations-general-assembly-resolution- embargo-imposed-usa-against en?utm source=chatgpt.com |
