We are not only in a phase of « return from war » ; We are in a phase of political, budgetary, industrial and media normalization of preparation for war. It's not exactly the same thing. The first is a strategic finding: the international order is more conflicting. The second is a cultural shift: war ceases to be thought of as the ultimate failure of politics to become a plausible horizon of public action.

The analysis must avoid two contrasensions.

The world has entered a phase of systemic conflict

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the high-intensity war has again become a European reality. This return destroyed several illusions: the illusion that economic interdependence would prevent major wars; the illusion that technological superiority would render attrition conflicts obsolete; The illusion that Europe could permanently delegate its security to the United States while maintaining political autonomy.

The war in Ukraine also recalled an ancient lesson: war rarely begins with a clear vision of its duration, its human cost, its material cost and its political effects. Many imagined a short war; It has settled in attrition, trenches, drones, artillery, massive losses, destruction of infrastructure and industrial mobilization. Technological modernity did not suppress industrial war; She hybridized it.

But Ukraine is not an isolated case. The international system is experiencing an accumulation of hotbeds of tension: confrontation between Russia and the West, Chinese-American rivalry, tensions around Taiwan, militarization of the Indo-Pacific, conflicts in the Middle East, war in Sudan, Sahelian insecurity, instability in the Red Sea, ballistic proliferation, nuclear risks, trade fragmentation and the crisis of multilateralism. The Munich Security Report 2025 describes this movement as a « Multipolarization », i.e. a world where more actors are challenging existing rules, hierarchies and areas of influence.

This context creates a dangerous cumulative effect: each power justifies its own rearmament by rearming others. Russia invokes Western circle; Europe invokes the Russian threat; the United States invokes China; China invokes US pressure; the regional powers invoke their immediate environment. Thus a classic strategic loop arises: each actor says to defend himself, but the whole system becomes more offensive, more unstable and more difficult to defuse.

Global rearmament is no longer marginal: it is massive, assumed and sustainable

The numbers confirm the changeover. According to SIPRI, global military spending reached $2,887 billion in 2025, a 2.9% real increase over 2024. Europe is one of the fastest-accelerated areas: European military spending reached $864 billion in 2025, an increase of 14% over one year and the highest European level ever recorded by SIPRI.

The IISS estimates slightly different, but confirms the same trend: global defence spending would have reached $2,630 billion in 2025, compared with $2,480 billion in 2024, representing real growth of 2.5 per cent. The IISS also notes that Europe now accounts for more than 21% of the world's total, compared with 17% in 2022, reflecting a rapid shift in budgetary effort towards European theatre.

This movement is not limited to conventional spending. Nuclear spending is also increasing. ICAN estimates that the nine nuclear-weapon States spent more than $100 billion in 2024 on their nuclear arsenals, or about $190,151 per minute, with an 11 per cent increase over one year. The United States remains by far the largest financier of nuclear expenditures, followed by China and the United Kingdom.

The phenomenon is therefore profound. This is not just a budgetary correction after years of underinvestment. It is a new cycle of militarization, with three dimensions: rebuilding stocks, technological modernization and industrial preparation for long conflicts.

Europe shifts from a logic of peace dividends to an economy of military preparation

For thirty years, much of Europe has lived on the « peace dividends » the end of the cold war: reduction of armies, relative decline in defence budgets, outsourcing of certain capabilities, NATO dependence, priority given to the social state, the single market, enlargement and currency. This model is now being challenged.

NATO took a major political course at the Hague Summit in June 2025: the Allies committed to devote 5% of their GDP per year to defence-related defence and security expenditures by 2035, of which at least 3.5% of GDP for essential military needs as defined in NATO.

The European Union follows the same logic. The ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan aims to mobilise up to €800 billion to strengthen the European defence effort. The European Commission has presented this plan as a means of giving Member States more budgetary flexibility, speeding up joint purchases, developing the European defence industry and reducing certain critical dependencies.

The European Defence White Paper — Readless 2030 identifies several capacitive priorities: air and missile defence, artillery systems, long range precision missiles, drones, military mobility, cyber capabilities, space, intelligence, ammunition, critical infrastructure protection and industrial power surge.

The problem is not that these priorities are absurd. Many are militarily consistent with the war in Ukraine. The problem is that they are gradually transforming public arbitration. When hundreds of billions are turned towards defence, public finances are not neutral: debt, levies, budget cuts or social investment carryovers become adjustment variables.

The IMF also stresses that military strengthening can support short-term activity, but increases deficits, public debt and inflationary pressures; on « Booms » The cost of war is even higher, with a significant increase in debt and lower social spending.

Trump's return exacerbates European strategic insecurity

The second Trump Presidency has reinforced an already old European concern: the American guarantee is no longer politically unconditional. For several years, the United States has been calling on Europeans to play a much greater role in financing their defence. But with Donald Trump, this request takes a more transactional form, sometimes brutal: protection against contribution; alliance against alignment; security against political loyalty.

Several recent analyses point out that Europeans are reassessing their dependence on the United States in the face of NATO's American threats or disengagement signals. The discussions focused on Europe's ability to offset a reduction in the role of the United States, including in the critical areas of intelligence, missile defence, command, supply, strategic transport, military technology and nuclear deterrence.

This is an essential point: Europe is not only re-arming because of Russia. She's also rearming because she discovers that her strategic life insurance — United States of America — may become uncertain. In other words, the war in Ukraine revealed the external threat; Trump reveals the fragility of the protector.

This produces a paradoxical effect. The more unpredictable the US, the more Europe speaks of strategic autonomy. But as the urgency increases, Europe remains dependent on existing American capabilities. Strategic autonomy is therefore declared politically before being achieved industrially, technologically and militarily.

The main sources of international tension

The current situation is dangerous because it juxtaposes several crises of a different nature. Some are territorial, others ideological, others economic, others technological. Their combination makes the international system more flammable.

A global crisis with huge human costs

Ukraine remains the central focus for Europe, but the crisis is global. Middle East conflicts disrupt trade and energy routes; Sudan has become one of the largest displacement crises in the world; tensions in Asia are driving Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and South-East Asia countries to build their capacity; China-US rivalry increasingly structure the world economy.

The human cost is already immense. UNHCR estimated that 123.2 million people were forcibly displaced at the end of 2024 due to persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations or events that seriously disrupt public order. Sudan is mentioned as one of the largest displacement crises, alongside Syria, Afghanistan and Ukraine.

ACLED recorded more than 204,000 conflicting events between December 2024 and November 2025, with more than 240,000 conservatively estimated deaths. These data show that the world is not only experiencing some spectacular crises; It is worked by a dense, diffuse and persistent conflict.

The resources devoted to war are considerable; those devoted to peace are politically less visible

The contrast is striking. Military expenditures are specific: $2,887 billion according to SIPRI in 2025; $864 billion for Europe; EUR 800 billion available in the European plan; NATO target of 5% of GDP; over $100 billion for nuclear arsenals in 2024.

On the other hand, diplomatic efforts are more difficult to identify. There are, of course: negotiations, sanctions, mediations, conferences, UN initiatives, discreet channels, prisoner exchanges, food security, humanitarian corridors. But it does not have the same political display, the same financial volume, or the same strategic readability.

This creates a democratic problem. Public opinion sees tanks, missiles, budgets, industrial announcements, martial declarations. They see much less de-escalation architectures, collective security proposals, arms control mechanisms, credible peace initiatives or post-crisis scenarios.

European history teaches that diplomacy must be engaged before positions become irreversible. In 1914, alliances, mobilizations and ultimatums reduced the space for compromise. In 1939, blindly faced with Nazi expansionism, the other danger was to believe that a revisionist power can be appeased indefinitely by concessions. The lesson is therefore neither « negotiate at all costs », « Fighting in principle ». The real lesson is more difficult: we must build a strategy where deterrence makes aggression costly, while diplomacy maintains a politically usable exit door.

The European risk: militarization without clear political doctrine

European rearmament can be justified militarily. But it becomes problematic if it is not linked to a clear political doctrine.

All these answers are possible, but they are not identical. Today, Europe seems to pursue several objectives simultaneously:

One of the major risks is the confusion between spending and power. Spending more is not enough. We must produce better, standardize more, jointly buy, reduce national duplications, secure supply chains, invest in ammunition, drones, ground-to-air defence, cyber security, intelligence, maintenance and training. Otherwise, Europe could spend massively without achieving proportional strategic capacity.

The other risk is political: a Europe that increases its military budgets while reducing its social spending can fuel democratic distrust. Citizens will find it difficult to accept budgetary sacrifices if they feel that choices are decided by an emergency mechanism, without debate on the aims, costs, risks and exit scenarios.

Modern war absorbs economic resources and transforms societies

War not only destroys lives and infrastructure; It reorients economies. It changes industrial priorities, budget circuits, research policies, logistics organisation, financial markets and political discourse. A war economy, even partial, creates its own beneficiaries, its built-up interests and its inertia.

The big winners are relatively identifiable: defence industry, ammunition producers, drone manufacturers, cybersecurity companies, space sectors, strategic energy suppliers, intelligence companies, logistics operators, banks financing major programs. This does not mean that these actors are illegitimate. A credible defence requires an industry. But this means that once the dynamics are initiated, it can create a politico-industrial complex conducive to prolonging the logic of confrontation.

The opportunity cost is considerable. Each billion committed to armaments is one billion that is not committed elsewhere, except to increase debt or taxation. Trade-offs will be made against health, school, energy transition, family policy, poverty alleviation, civil research, infrastructure or development aid. The World Bank points out that the world economy is already facing counterwinds related to trade tensions, political uncertainty and the difficulty of emerging economies in creating enough jobs and reducing extreme poverty.

This is where the comment on the « Social and Human Welfare » It's all in its reach. Re-arming may be necessary in a dangerous environment; But it becomes morally and politically problematic if it replaces any reflection on human security. A society can be militarily more protected while becoming socially more fragile. A socially fractured society is also strategically vulnerable.

European oblivion of war: not a historical oblivion, but a political refoulement

Europe has not completely forgotten the two world wars. It commemorates them abundantly. But it sometimes commemorates them as closed events, almost heritage events, and not as active political warnings. Memory becomes ceremonial rather than operational.

The First World War showed the gear: rigid alliances, nationalisms, belief in a short war, industrial mobilization, inability to stop the machine once launched. The Second World War had shown the other extreme: the failure of collective security, the underestimation of an expansionist regime, the illusion that territorial concessions would suffice to avoid confrontation.

The current situation is neither 1914 nor 1939. Historical analogies are useful as warnings, but dangerous as automatisms. Putin's Russia is not Nazi Germany; NATO is not the 1914 Agreement; The European Union is not the League of Nations; nuclear weapon profoundly changes the nature of escalation. But one constant remains: major wars often arise from a mixture of rational interests, false perceptions, national pride, miscalculation, binding alliances, propaganda and the absence of an honourable exit.

Why peace initiatives seem weak or inaudible

There are several reasons.

First, the objectives of the parties are incompatible.Ukraine legitimately refuses to validate annexation of its territories. Russia seeks to convert military gains into political gains. Europeans want to prevent Russian victory, but do not want to go directly to war. The US fluctuates between support, strategic fatigue and Asian priorities. This incompatibility makes mediation extremely difficult.

Secondly, diplomacy is politically suspicious.In many public debates, calling for negotiation is immediately considered either naivety or complacency with the aggressor. Conversely, speaking only of victory can become a moral posture without a credible operational path. The public debate then closed between two caricatures: « warring parties » and « capital ».

Thirdly, multilateral institutions are weakened.The UN Security Council is paralysed as soon as a permanent member or his direct ally is involved. Arms control treaties have eroded. Trust between great powers is weak. The average powers are trying to mediate, but they are often suspected of being behind-thinking.

Fourth, information warfare radicalizes opinions.Social networks, news channels, partisan media and influence operations reduce the space for nuance. Diplomacy requires secrecy, compromise and time; media space requires slogans, culprits and immediateness.

Fifthly, some actors may think that time is working for them.In a war attrition, each side may believe that the other will exhaust before it. This logic prolongs conflicts.

What a realistic peace strategy should contain

A serious peace initiative cannot be a mere moral exhortation. It must integrate the balance of power. It must also recognize that peace is not just the cessation of fire; It is a lasting political, security, economic and legal arrangement.