The ATSC and the birth of the Office of Remigration

The mechanism documented by journalists is based on what the US administration refers to as Third Country National Arrangements (TCNA). Its operation is apparently simple: a person in the United States is subject to removal, but his return to his country of origin is impossible — because of the risk of persecution or torture, because that State refuses to take it back, or for other practical reasons. Washington is looking for another state willing to receive it, a country that may have virtually no connection with it. Thus, individuals were sent to States of which they did not possess nationality, where they had never lived and where they sometimes spoke no language.

One of the most significant contributions of the survey concerns the creation in May 2025 of a specialised structure within the European Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration State Department:Office of Remigration, the Office of Remigration. Forbidden Stories reports that about fifteen people make up this structure, headed by diplomat Christian Jové Ehrhardt, who previously specialized in diplomatic security. Institutional change is significant: traditionally, the policy of expulsion is a matter for domestic policy and immigration authorities. Under this arrangement, it also becomes an integral part of American diplomacy, with the State Department negotiating directly with foreign governments the reception of third-country nationals. Migration policy is thus partly transformed into foreign policy — and the very choice of name chosen for this structure, on which we will return in the last part of this analysis, is not a semantic chance.

A real legal basis, but unprecedented use

Contrary to a hasty reading which would see this device as a pure illegal innovation, the Congressional Research Service recalls thatImmigration and Nationality Act does, in certain circumstances, provide for the possibility of moving a person to a third country willing to accept it, where the destinations usually provided for by law — the country of origin or country with which the person has a connection — are tried « Impracticable, not recommended or impossible ». However, this option remains subject to specific protections against return to a country where the person would be at risk of persecution, as well as to the United Nations Convention against Torture, the provisions of which prohibit the transfer to a State where the person would be likely to be tortured. The basic problem of the current system is therefore not the mere existence of a possibility of expulsion to a third country. — which already existed —, but the scale, systematization and procedural conditions under which this exceptional mechanism is now mobilised on a very large scale.

When migration becomes subject to interstate negotiation

The most significant aspect of the issue is that these migration agreements almost never work in isolation: they often involve financial assistance, health programmes, humanitarian financing, border management cooperation or broader diplomatic concessions. The Cameroonian example is particularly revealing here. Christian Ehrhardt went to Yaoundé in November 2025; an agreement allowing the reception of third-country nationals is finalised in December; the same month, the United States approved a health programme of approximately $400 million over five years; A month later, Washington announced an additional $30 million to UNHCR in Cameroon, including to facilitate voluntary returns. The chronological proximity of these announcements is accurately documented by the survey; However, it alone is not sufficient to establish legally that the $400 million was the explicit counterpart to the migration agreement. Analytical rigour therefore requires a careful distinction between a well-documented correlation and a contractually established counterparty. — even if, in several other cases identified by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, the documents consulted explicitly mention amounts directly related to the acceptance of third-country nationals, such as Rwanda or Eswatini, on which we will return.

A three-tiered financial architecture and fragmented accountability

The documents analyzed by Forbidden Stories reveal a relatively sophisticated financial architecture. Of the approximately $410 million planned, approximately 20% would have been directed to some partner governments, while more than $178 million was programmed for the International Organization for Migration and more than $123 million for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. This set-up produces a three-tiered system: Washington finances third States and international organizations, which in turn take care of expelled persons. This architecture has a clear political advantage for the US administration, that of transforming domestic policy into an international chain of migration management; However, it raises a question of decisive responsibility, which does not have a simple answer: who becomes legally and politically responsible for a person after his transfer — The expelling State, the receiving State, the international organization that finances or organizes its journey, or several of these actors simultaneously? It is precisely this fragmentation of responsibility that makes the system as difficult to challenge legally as it is to reform politically.

A disproportionate position, but motivations that must not be simplified

In 2026, Amnesty International identified at least 12 African States that had received or agreed to receive third-country nationals from the United States: Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Uganda and Cape Verde. The network expanded further during the year: CBS News documented a series of flights that, in just ten days, sent more than 100 people to eight distinct African countries. Africa's choice is probably not due to a single factor: the dependence of some states on external aid, the structural diplomatic asymmetries with Washington, the financial capacity of the United States, the real need for security cooperation, the state of pre-existing bilateral relations, and the willingness of some governments to obtain concrete economic or diplomatic benefits. However, it would be wrong, and empirically incorrect, to present all African governments as uniformly passive actors: agreements differ considerably from one country to another, some governments have imposed explicit restrictions. — Uganda, for example, excluded persons with criminal records and unaccompanied minors, and gave priority to persons of African origin —and African States do not necessarily pursue the same interests in these negotiations.

Rwanda: Continuity of an outsourcing laboratory

Rwanda already held a central position in the global debate on the outsourcing of asylum through the British project to transfer asylum seekers from the United Kingdom to Kigali — project launched in 2022 under the conservative government of Rishi Sunak, never implemented in practice, and formally abandoned on 6 July 2024 by the new Labour Prime Minister Keir Starmer, who called it a policy « dead and buried before even starting ». In the US scheme, Kigali has agreed to host up to 250 people, in exchange for about $7.5 million in US aid according to documents consulted by Human Rights Watch. This continuity is significant: Rwanda appears to be one of the laboratories of a more general idea, that of dissociating the territory where a person requests protection from the territory in which his or her case or stay will ultimately be managed — One of the most profound conceptual changes in contemporary migration policies, which will be discussed in Part VII of this analysis.

Eswatini: the most spectacular example of triangular geography

The agreement with the Eswatini illustrates this logic even more strongly. According to the documents reviewed by Human Rights Watch, Washington has committed about $5.1 million to strengthen the kingdom's migration and border management capacity in exchange for the potential reception of up to 160 third-country nationals. As of 10 September 2026, the Third Country Deportation Watch had 32 people actually sent to Eswatini, including from Vietnam, Yemen, Cuba, Jamaica, Laos, Ethiopia, Haiti, the Philippines, Somalia, the Sudan, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Cameroon and Mauritania. The resulting geography becomes striking: a Vietnamese national expelled from the United States to Eswatini, a Cuban sent to southern Africa, a Mexican protected against a return to Mexico but transferred to the same kingdom. The migration here ceases to be structured around the classical couple « country of origin » to become triangular: country of origin → United States → third countries, without any of the three poles necessarily correspond to a pre-existing link of the data subject.

Protecting someone from their country and then evicting them elsewhere

This is probably the most delicate legal point in the whole case. Some concerned persons had been granted protection in the United States against their return to their country of origin because a judge had recognized a real risk of persecution or torture. This does not necessarily mean that they had an absolute right to remain indefinitely in the United States; But their transfer to a third country raises a new and crucial question: will this third country really guarantee their security and prevent their subsequent return to the country initially considered dangerous? This is the problem of indirect refoulement, sometimes referred to as chain return — A mechanism by which the initial transfer may indirectly lead to the very result that international law was seeking to prevent: a Gambian national expelled to Ghana under the agreement thus stated, in an affidavit filed before a US federal court, that the Ghanaian authorities had subsequently returned to his country of origin, even though the US court had recognized that he was at serious risk of persecution because of his sexual orientation.

The principle of non-refoulement and the conditions imposed by UNHCR

Article 3 of the Convention against Torture prohibits any State from expelling, returning or extraditeing a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture. At the same time, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees considers that when a transfer of asylum-seekers to another State is organised, it is imperative that several cumulative conditions be guaranteed: effective admission to the receiving country, effective protection against refoulement, access to a fair asylum procedure, treatment in accordance with international standards, prior individual assessment of the risk involved, and an effective possibility of challenging the transfer to an independent court. In other words, an agreement between two governments, regardless of its formal legality under the domestic law of each, does not in any way negate the individual rights of the person transferred. This is a decisive principle, which structures the whole of the litigation today pending before the US courts.

The « diplomatic assurances » : real guarantee or legal fiction?

Washington relies in particular on diplomatic assurances provided by receiving States, the reasoning of which can be summarized as follows: « the recipient government guarantees that this person will not be persecuted or tortured. » The US procedure introduced in 2025 specifically provides that the Department of Homeland Security verifies the existence of such assurances, and that the State Department considers them credible before authorizing the transfer. However, this mechanism remains legally contested: diplomatic insurance does not necessarily amount to a judicial guarantee that can be invoked before a court. It all depends, in reality, on its precision, its binding nature, the effective possibilities for independent monitoring, the real access of lawyers to the persons concerned, the independence of the courts of the receiving country, the concrete conditions of detention, and, above all, the consequences of a proven breach of these commitments. It is precisely for this reason that individual procedural guarantees — and not only inter-State insurance — become the determining criterion of the legality of a transfer.

A Judicial Battle Still Moving

The dispute is currently one of the most decisive elements of the case. As early as February 2025, the Department of Internal Security had issued internal guidelines extending the use of evictions to third countries, which immediately led to a collective remedy. In June 2025, the Supreme Court suspended the order of a lower court, allowing the administration to resume transfers. In February 2026, the District Court handed down a final decision overturning the policy of the Department of Internal Security; but the Federal Court of Appeal of the first circuit granted a stay of this decision, allowing the policy to remain applicable for the duration of the appeal proceedings. On 18 September 2026, however, the same Court of Appeal largely upheld, on the merits, the lower court's decision challenging the legality of the scheme when it did not allow the persons concerned an effective opportunity to assert their fears before their transfer. The administration should bring the case to the Supreme Court, and the Department of Homeland Security argued, immediately after the judgment, that the policy remained applicable until the appeal decision had formally entered into force. It would therefore be premature to state that the mechanism was finally declared illegal or permanently interrupted: the case remains, at the time when these lines are drafted, actively contested before the courts.

What separates a defensible device from a disputed device

A transfer mechanism to a third country is substantially more defensible in international law when it is based on a combination of precise procedural guarantees. The absence or insufficiency of several of these guarantees is precisely what is now fuelling US litigation.

Double-edged sovereignty

The paradox that goes through the entire African issue deserves to be precisely formulated. A government can legitimately invoke its sovereignty to freely conclude an agreement with Washington: « We are sovereign, we can accept these people. » But we can oppose it, just as legitimately, a second conception of sovereignty: should a truly sovereign State accept that its territory becomes the instrument for the execution of the internal policy of a foreign power? The two reasonings are also admissible, because sovereignty means simultaneously the contractual freedom of the State and its ability not to suffer the preferences of the outside powers. The political challenge is therefore to determine, by agreement, whether there is voluntary cooperation or cooperation made possible by a strong asymmetry of economic and diplomatic power.

The democratic deficit: who actually allows these agreements?

There is still insufficient discussion in the public debate: are national parliaments really involved in these decisions? When a government accepts several hundred or even thousands of foreign nationals in exchange for international funding, several questions should normally be the subject of a transparent public debate: what is the exact legal status of the persons concerned? Do they have the right to work? Can they apply for asylum on the spot? Who finances their stay, and for how long? Can they leave the country freely or risk being detained? Who decides, if any, on their subsequent re-expulsion? What effective remedies do they have? What happens if their country of origin refuses to return permanently? Are agreements subject to parliamentary scrutiny, and is there budgetary control independent of the use of funds? This lack of transparency is precisely one of the central concerns expressed by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, which explicitly calls on African States to make public existing or envisaged agreements.

The ambiguous role of international organizations

The survey also raised a delicate issue concerning UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration, through which a substantial share of US funding was channelled. Their presence produces a real paradox: without them, transferees would risk receiving far less effective protection on the ground; their intervention may indirectly make operational a political mechanism which they have neither designed nor approved. UNHCR also insists on a distinction that it considers fundamental: it claims not to be a party to bilateral agreements themselves, and states that the funds received are used exclusively to strengthen national asylum systems in accordance with its mandate. The International Organization for Migration takes a similar position, recalling that intervening with migrant persons does not mean approving political decisions that led to their expulsion. It is a classic dilemma, well known for all contemporary humanitarian action: to refuse to participate in order not to legitimize a questionable system, or to participate precisely to protect those who are directly affected by it? There is no theoretically satisfactory and practically simple answer to this question.

The actual accounting of the transaction, beyond the facial amount

The economic analysis of these agreements cannot reasonably stop at the only amount announced publicly. Real public accounting for the operation should include direct US funding, additional international financing, any infrastructure built and indirect diplomatic benefits obtained; It should also include, in terms of costs, accommodation, security, administration, judicial procedures, health, possible integration, subsequent returns, continuous monitoring, diffuse social costs, as well as the diplomatic and reputational risks associated with them. Actual net income could be very different from the initially announced facial amount — especially since some persons may remain in the host country for a long time if their country of origin continues to refuse their return, transforming a one-time remuneration into a long-term social obligation which the host country will have to assume alone, once the media projectors are diverted.

The risk of a global market for food and the need for a common African doctrine

An additional risk must be anticipated with clarity: if the reception of third-country nationals becomes financially remunerative, several States could enter into open competition with each other — One accepting 500 people, another accepting a thousand, a third proposing less demanding conditions to attract financing. This would gradually lead to a real market for territorial supply of migration, in which the bargaining power would belong almost exclusively to the financier. It is precisely in order to prevent this dynamic that the African Union would benefit from defining a common continental doctrine. The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights set out the first elements of this in its resolution 645, adopted on 30 October 2025 in Banjul: it stresses that African States should not enter into migration partnerships when they know, or should reasonably know, that such agreements involve a real risk of serious human rights violations; calls for the systematic publication of existing or envisaged agreements; It recalls that collective expulsions and forced transfers without individual examination are prohibited by Article 12(5) of the African Charter; and invites African States to strengthen South-South cooperation rather than accept structurally asymmetric partnerships.

Presenting this policy as an American singularity would be misleading

The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights is not only targeting the United States in its resolution 645: it explicitly mentions European cooperation aimed at financing migration control capacities in Africa, as well as mechanisms to prevent certain departures to Europe. There is therefore a wider movement, which can be summed up in a logical sequence: from the traditional territorial border, one moves to upstream control, then to outsourcing itself, then to financing of partner states, and finally to the treatment or retention of persons outside the national territory. The border is no longer just a geographical line: it becomes a transnational mobility control network, of which the European Union and several of its Member States are major players, well before the arrival of the US Remigration Office.

Denmark as a normative precursor to an idea never fully realized

Denmark has a special place in the European genealogy of outsourcing. As early as June 2021, the Danish Parliament adopted, by 70 votes to 24, a law allowing the country to transfer the examination of asylum applications filed on its territory to a third country, the foreigner registered in Denmark to be returned directly to Denmark for the examination of his case. In September 2022, Copenhagen and Kigali signed a declaration of bilateral cooperation explicitly considering the establishment of a programme whereby asylum seekers arriving in Denmark could be transferred to Rwanda for examination of their application. However, this project, which has been regularly relaunched since then, has never been fully implemented, and the Council of Europe has repeatedly called on Denmark to abandon any plans to outsource the processing of asylum applications. The Danish precedent, however, remains essential to understand: it is a founding Member State of the European Union, known for the strength of its rule of law, which has the first legal standardized idea that the protection due to an asylum seeker can be provided outside the territory where the application is lodged. — opening, without necessarily wanting to, a conceptual breach that others would then exploit more resolutely.

Italy by Giorgia Meloni: the model that persists despite judicial obstacles

The protocol signed at the end of 2023 between Italy and Albania is, to date, the most successful achievement of this logic in Europe. It provides for the outsourcing of asylum applications from persons intercepted at sea to two centres run by Italy near the Albanian port of Shengjin, which can accommodate up to three thousand migrants and asylum seekers simultaneously. The first transfers, in 2024, were quickly invalidated by the Court of Rome and then by the Italian Court of Cassation, which held that the criteria of « safe countries of origin » unilaterally defined by the Meloni government were not in conformity with EU law. On 23 April 2026, however, the Opinion of the Advocate General of the Court of Justice of the European Union held that the Italian-Albanian agreement was, in principle, compatible with Union law, provided that all the fundamental rights of the persons concerned were scrupulously guaranteed — opening the way for a possible re-launch of the scheme on the entry into force, scheduled for 2026, of the new European Pact on Migration and Asylum. Giorgia Meloni has also publicly stated that the centres « function exactly as expected from the start » once this legal framework is fully applicable.

The Regulation « Returns » : the European Union institutionalises its own hubs

On 26 March 2026 the European Parliament adopted its position on a new « Returns », by 389 votes, in a vote marked by an unprecedented alliance between the classical right and the far right, breaking what the commentators traditionally designate as the « Health cord » excluding any formal cooperation with extreme right parties at European level. This legislation provides for the extension of the maximum period of administrative detention from 18 to 24 months, the abolition of the automatic and generalized suspensive effect for all appeals against a decision to expel, and in particular the creation of a permanent « return hubs » : centres outside the territory of the European Union, to which illegal third-country nationals could be sent pending their permanent removal. This text must now be the subject of interinstitutional negotiations with the Council and the Commission before its final adoption, but there is little doubt as to its general orientation: the European Union is, in turn, and by the most solemn legal means, — a regulation adopted by its co-legislators —, of an institutional architecture of outsourcing directly comparable, in its logic if not in its magnitude, to the American Remigration Office.

Potsdam, November 2023: the political genesis of a word

The very word of « Remigration » The U.S. Department of State's appointment of its new office is not neutral: it comes directly from the vocabulary of the extreme European right, where it has acquired a considerable political burden since the end of 2023. On November 25, 2023, about 20 people gathered at Villa Adlon, on the shores of Lake Lehnitz, near Potsdam, Germany, at the invitation of two organizers close to the identity movement. Austrian activist Martin Sellner, former spokesperson for the Identity Movement in Austria, presented a plan he himself described as « Remigration », aimed at moving three categories of persons outside Germany: asylum seekers, foreigners with residence permits, and German citizens tried « Other ». According to the report published on 10 January 2024 by the investigative organisation Correctiv, Sellner also referred to the idea of « Model State » to be set up in North Africa, in the form of a special economic zone leased for this purpose, capable of welcoming up to two million people. Participants included members of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party, including Roland Hartwig, then Personal Adviser to the President of the Alice Weidel party, as well as several regional elected representatives of the party. — of which Ulrich Siegmund, then Chairman of the AfD Group in the Parliament of the Land of Saxony-Anhalt, to which we shall return later —alongside members of the CDU Conservative Party and identity activists.

A disputed revelation, but an undisputed political fact

The revelation of this meeting caused a considerable political shock in Germany: between 19 and 21 January 2024, several hundred thousand people demonstrated in the major German cities against AfD and the project thus revealed, with some estimates evoking up to 1.4 million participants across the country, while a debate started on a possible party ban procedure. However, there is no consensus on all aspects of this story, and intellectual honesty requires that it be pointed out with precision: several participants have taken legal action against Correctiv. In March 2026, a Berlin Regional Court found the claim that the meeting specifically targeted the expulsion of German citizens themselves; Correctiv appealed this decision. By December 2025, a court in Hamburg had validated the bulk of the publication, while calling it an article of opinion rather than a strictly factual report. What remains undisputed, however, including by Martin Sellner himself in his own public statements, is that he has presented to some 20 people a plan explicitly named « Remigration »targeting asylum seekers and foreigners in a regular situation, with the idea of « Model State » North African. It is this undisputed part of the facts, and not the points still before the courts, that served as the basis for the subsequent normalisation of the term in the European political debate.

Remigration Summit: a far-right international and transatlantic junction

What was, at the end of 2023, only a plan discussed behind closed doors became, within two years, a political event assumed and sought by the media: the first Remigration Summit held in May 2025 in Gallarate, near Milan, bringing together about 400 participants around members of the Identity Movement, with the notable participation of the MEP for the Lega Roberto Vannacci. The second edition, organised on 30 May 2026 in Figueira da Foz in Portugal by Martin Sellner himself, brought together between 500 and 600 participants from Europe, Canada and the United States, including representatives of the German AfD and the Spanish party Vox — He sent his deputy Carlos Hernández Quero there. The transatlantic dimension of this gathering is documented with a particularly significant precision for our comment: According to Politico Europe, the former interim commander of the American border patrol, Gregory Bovino, attended as guest of honour, alongside the American white supremacist Jared Taylor, and publicly criticized some officials of the Trump administration — including Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security and White House Advisor — to have, according to him, « sweetened » American migration strategy. This scene is illuminating: it shows that the circulation of ideas and people between the European far right and certain circles of the American administration is not a mere lexical coincidence, but a real political porosity assumed by its own actors.

From the theory to the urn: the AfD, Vox, and the « Remigration » as claimed public policy

What distinguishes the present moment from the controversy of 2024 is the transition from the end of the in camera discussion to the open electoral claim. In the regional election of Saxony-Anhalt on 6 September 2026, AfD won 43.8% of the vote. — his best result ever in a German regional election, more than double his score five years ago —, by explicitly campaigning on a platform of « Remigration ». Its candidate, Ulrich Siegmund — precisely one of the participants identified at the Potsdam meeting in 2023 —publicly stated that « Remigration applies to anyone who does not contribute to society »explicitly including unemployed Ukrainian refugees in this category, and promised a « Remigration and expulsion offensive » From the first day of government. In Spain, Vox President Santiago Abascal similarly stated in mid-September 2026 that it was time for « Close doors » and initiate a process of « Remigration » for people living in Spain « at the expense of the work of others » — One of the three axes he placed at the centre of his political communication. The term, born in the Austrian and German identity circles, has thus become, in the space of less than three years, a campaign axis assumed by parties which progress significantly in several European countries: the National Rally in France, the FPÖ in Austria, winner of the 2024 general elections, the Vlaams Belang in Flanders, and the Dutch PVV of Geert Wilders.

A name that does not deceive anyone

It would be naive to consider as purely accidental the choice, by the US State Department, of the name « Office of Remigration » to designate its new diplomatic structure. This lexical choice is part of a context where the term has been circulating for several years as an identity marker assumed by a growing part of the Western far right. — and where American actors close to this movement openly participate in European gatherings that promote it, as the presence of Gregory Bovino at the Portuguese Summit Remigration illustrates. This semantic convergence does not mean that American policy of expulsion to third countries is based on the same ideological doctrine as the plan presented in Potsdam. — legal logics, scales and target audiences differ significantly — But it points to a real porosity between a vocabulary long confined to the most radical margins of European political debate and its adoption, even in official terminology, by the administrative apparatus of the world's first power. It is precisely this porosity that explains why part of the European far right can today openly designate American politics as a model to imitate, rather than as a foreign policy among others.

Merchandising migration capacity

Trade in goods, mining concessions, military bases, fishing rights, port concessions and carbon quotas were already known in international economic relations. In some contemporary international relations, a new resource must now be added: the ability to receive negotiable migrants. Developed States have capital, diplomatic capabilities, development aid, market access, visas, financial instruments and, sometimes, sanctions; partner countries have a resource whose economic and diplomatic value is gradually emerging: their territory. Driven to its end, this logic could lead to a form of international specialization where some states would become countries of production, others as financial centres, others as tax havens — and some, immigration retention, transit or relocation platforms. This is precisely what makes the phenomenon structurally different from a simple classical bilateral expulsion: the rich state no longer only says « Take back your national », he can now say « accept in your territory someone who is not your national, and we will fund part of his care or other programs ».

Can we buy the right not to welcome?

This is ultimately the most fundamental philosophical question raised by this whole evolution. In a world with considerable wealth gaps, can a country with significant resources transfer some of its human responsibilities to a much poorer country simply because it has the financial means to outsource it? The legal response is not automatically negative, as international law does not in principle prohibit any form of migration cooperation between sovereign States. But the moral question remains — For such a logic can ultimately lead to the transformation of wealth into the ability to decide who enters, who stays, who leaves, and especially where he who leaves will have to go. On the other hand, it would be equally excessive to consider that a State that had ever received an alien would necessarily bear the perpetual obligation to keep it indefinitely in its territory: the real difficulty lies precisely between these two principles, neither one nor the other being reasonably capable of being established in absolute terms.

From the globalization of goods to the globalization of population management

The case revealed by Forbidden Stories ultimately exceeds Donald Trump's only presidency, and even the only American policy. It reveals a more general evolution of contemporary international relations: we may be moving from the globalization of goods to the globalization of capital, then of value chains, then of data, and now to an unprecedented form of globalization of population management considered undesirable. The persons concerned become mobile not only because they freely choose to migrate, but because States actively organise their movement among themselves. — a considerable development, whose exact scope and lasting consequences still have to be measured, but whose trajectory, from Washington to Copenhagen, from Kigali to Rome, from Potsdam to Figueira da Foz, already outlines the contours of a new global migratory order.